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The most important' and most difficult2 decision in the process of
international negotiation may very well be the threshold decision of
states to enter into negotiations in the first place. Once the will to
resolve a dispute through negotiation is present on the part of national
leaders, agreement on procedures and substance, while usually protract-
ed and arduous, is likely to follow. At the very least, agreement be-
comes a real possibility since the mutual decision to negotiate already
represents a public commitment to the cooperative resolution or manage-
ment of the dispute. Even if negotiation does not produce agreement, it
does afford the disputing parties the opportunity to lessen tensions and
to learn more about each other's interests, positions, personalities, and
problems.
The critical importance of "getting to the table" has been recognized
by both diplomats and scholars. A substantial body of nonlegal litera-
ture, describing and analyzing what has come to be called the
"prenegotiation" phase, has developed over the past decade.4 Similar
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1. "Nor should we overlook the psychological value of the opening of negotiations ....
The opening of ... negotiations is often a decisive step toward the conclusion of an agree-
ment." International Status of South-West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 128, 188 (Advisory Opinion,
July 11) [hereinafter International Status of South-West Africa] (de Visscher, J., dissenting).
See also Harold H. Saunders, Getting to Negotiation, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1503 (1982) [herein-
after Saunders, Getting to Negotiation].
2. In many cases, persuading parties in a conflict to commit to a negotiated settlement is
even more complicated, time-consuming, and difficult than reaching agreement once the
negotiations have begun. Harold H. Saunders, We Need a Larger Theory of Negotiation: The
Importance of Pre-negotiating Phases, I NEG. J. 249, 249 (1985) [hereinafter Saunders, We
Need a Larger Theory of Negotiation].
3. See generally John G. Cross, Negotiation as a Learning Process, in THE NEGOTIA-
TION PROCESS: THEORIES AND APPLICATIONS 29 (1. William Zartman ed., 1978) [hereinafter
THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS].
4. See, e.g., HAROLD H. SAUNDERS, THE OTIIER WALLS: THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE
PROCESS IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 21-38, passim (rev. ed. 1991) [hereinafter SAUNDERS,
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systematic scrutiny, however, has not been devoted by legal scholars to
the legal context in which the commitment to negotiate international
disputes occurs, although some legal writing does exist which bears on
particular aspects of the prenegotiation process.5 One may well ask: are
there rules of international law which require negotiations in certain
situations? If so, what is the content of such rules? Do these rules affect
the decisions of national leaders to enter into international negotiations?
What are the possible consequences when national leaders fail to enter
into negotiations when obliged to do so by customary or conventional
international law? It is the purpose of this article to examine these and
related questions with the goal of calling to the attention of national
leaders and the practitioners of international diplomacy the requirements
of peaceful settlement of disputes and international cooperation through
negotiation. Such obligations are increasingly present in positive interna-
tional law and will likely assume greater importance in the future.6
THE OTHER WALLS]. See generally RICHARD N. HAASS, CONFLICTS UNENDING: THE UNITED
STATES AND REGIONAL DISPUTES (1990); GETTING TO THE TABLE: THE PROCESSES OF
INTERNATIONAL PRENEGOTIATION (Janice Gross Stein ed., 1989) [hereinafter GETTING TO
THE TABLE]; 1. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, RIPE FOR RESOLUTION: CONFLICT AND INTERVENTION IN
AFRICA (1989); Saunders, Getting to Negotiation, supra note 1; Saunders, We Need a Larger
Theory of Negotiation, supra note 2. See also Stern, International Agreements - Agreement
to Enter into Comprehensive Negotiations, Ethiopian-Eritrean People's Liberation Front
(EPLF), Final Communiqui, September 19, 1989, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 339, 339 (1990).
5. See FREDERIC KIRGIS, JR., PRIOR CONSULTATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A STUDY
OF STATE PRACTICE 3 (1983); JUDO UMARTO KUSUMOWIDAGDO, CONSULTATION CLAUSES As
MEANS OF PROVIDING FOR TREATY OBEDIENCE: A STUDY IN THE LAW OF TREATIES 4
(1981); TEKLEWOLD GEBREHANA, DUTY TO NEGOTIATE: AN ELEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1 (1978); Ulrich Beyerlin, Pactum de Contrahendo und Pactum de Negotiando im
Vlkerrecht?, 36 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND
VOLKERRECHT 407, 408 (1976); Paul Reuter, De L'obligation de Ndgocier, 14 COM-
UNICAZIONI E STUDI 711, 714 (1975); Hugo J. Hahn, Das Pactum de Negotiando als
Volkerrechtliche Entscheidungsnorm, 18 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFTSDIENST DES BETRIEBS-BERATERS
489, 490 (1972); Adolfo Miaja de la Muela, Pacta de Contrahendo en Derecho Internacional
Publico, 21 REVISTA ESPANOLA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 392, 393 (1968).
There is surprisingly little legal literature on international negotiation. "La negociation
est une opdration matrielle dont le droit international g6ndral a peu de chose ,l dire .... "
JEAN COMBACAU, LE DROIT DES TRAIT9S 16 (1991). "La n6gociation est peu connue des
juristes et elle est presque ignorde du droit." Reuter, supra, at 714. But see Kenneth J.
Vandevelde, Treaty Interpretation from a Negotiator's Perspective, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 281, 283 (1988); Tariq Hassan, Good Faith in Treaty Formation, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 443,
445 (1981); Grigore Geaminu, Thiorie et Pratique des Negociations en droit international,
166 REC. DES COURS 365, 367 (1980); Jean-Pierre Cot, La Bonne Foi et la Conclusion des
Traitis, 1 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INT'L 140, 141 (1968); Edwin M. Smith, Understanding
Dynamic Obligations: Arms Control Agreements, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1549, 1555 (1991).
6. In his discussion of this issue, Paul Reuter states:
Comme les engagements intemationaux se multiplient en s'dtendant , des objets de
plus en plus vastes, mettant en cause des aspects techniques ardus et ddlicats, il
devient difficile de conclure ces traitds en une seule opdration et les Etats signent
[Vol. 16:141
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The usual outcome of successful international negotiations is the
conclusion of a legally binding international agreement or treaty.7 The
process of concluding a legally binding international agreement can be
divided into several successive phases. The first phase is the prenegotia-
tion stage which transpires before a mutual commitment to negotiations
has been made. 8 The second phase is the process of the negotiations
itself, during which the negotiating states9 engage in substantive discus-
sions and bargaining.' ° The final phase is the period between the con-
des accords de principe en renvoyant les mesures d'application i des accords
ult&ieurs qu'ils s'obligent A n6gocier.
Reuter, supra note 5, at 712; see also id. at 733.
7. The terms "treaty" and "international agreement" are used interchangeably in this
article to refer to bilateral or multilateral international legal obligations voluntarily undertaken
by states. Thus, the term "treaty" is not used in the narrower sense in which it is employed in
Article l(l)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 1, para. 1(a), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
333, 8 I.L.M. 679, 681 (1969) (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (defining a treaty as "an
international agreement concluded between States in written form .... ) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties]. The term "treaty," as used in this article, should also not
be confused with the way it is defined in the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2 &
art. VI (defining a treaty as an international obligation of the United States ratified by the
President upon the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate). See also PAUL REUTER,
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TREATIES 23 (Josd Mico & Peter Haggenmacher trans., 1989)
(1985) ("A treaty is an expression of concurring wills attributable to two or more subjects of
international law and intended to have legal effects under the rules of international law.").
Negotiations that result in nonbinding understandings, "gentlemen's agreements," or
nonbinding agreements which are said to be "binding" at the political level may also be
regarded as successful if in fact international disputes or problems are resolved or mitigated.
Perhaps the most important recent agreement of-this type is the Final Act of the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Aug. 1, 1975, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE PUB. No. 8826,
GEN. FOREIGN POL'Y SERIES 298 (1975), 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975) [hereinafter Helsinki Ac-
cords]. See generally EMMANUEL DECAUX, S9CURIT9 ET COOPIRATION EN EUROPE (1992);
VOJTECH MASTNY, THE HELSINKI PROCESS AND THE REINTEGRATION OF EUROPE: ANALYSIS
AND DOCUMENTATION (1992). See also Anthony Aust, The Theory and Practice of Informal
International Instruments, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 787 (1986); SHABTAI ROSENNE, DEVELOP-
MENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES 1945-1986 90-95 (1989).
8. See infra note 33 and accompanying text for a definition of "prenegotiation."
9. The term "negotiating state" is used in this article in a sense similar to that employed
in Article 2(l)(e) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 7, to refer to
a state which participates in the negotiating process. "Negotiating state" is to be distinguished
from "party", which "means a State which has consented to be bound by [a] treaty and for
which the treaty is in force." Id., art. 2(l)(g).
10. There is a vast amount of literature on the various aspects of the theory and practice
of international negotiations. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. HABEEB, POWER AND TACTICS IN INTER-
NATIONAL NEGOTIATION: HOW WEAK NATIONS BARGAIN WITH STRONG NATIONS (1988);
MARTIN PATCHEN, RESOLVING DISPUTES BETWEEN NATIONS: CONCILIATION OR COERCION?
(1988); NEGOTIATING WORLD ORDER: THE ARTISANSHIP AND ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL
DIPLOMACY (Alan K. Henrikson ed., 1986); L.N. RANGARAJAN, THE LIMITATION OF CON-
FLICT: A THEORY OF BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION (1985); MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION
AND MEDIATION: INSTRUMENTS AND METHODS (Arthur S. Lall ed., 1985) [hereinafter MULTI-
LATERAL NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION]; HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF
Fall 1994]
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clusion of negotiations" and the entry into force 2 of the recently negoti-
ated obligations. Once the agreement enters into force, it creates binding
legal obligations for its parties. In that sense, the outcome of the negoti-
ating process is fully protected by law: the parties are legally obligated
to perform in good faith the obligations they have assumed 3 and the
NEGOTIATION (1982); ALAIN PLANTEY, LA NtGOCIATION INTERNATIONALE (1980); CHARLES
LOCKHART, BARGAINING IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS (1979); ORAN R. YOUNG, THE
POLITICS OF FORCE (1968); ARTHUR S. LALL, MODERN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION:
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (1966) [hereinafter LALL, MODERN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIA-
TION]; FRED C. IKL9, How NATIONS NEGOTIATE (1964). See also JIMMY CARTER, NEGOTIA-
TION: AN ALTERNATIVE TO HOSTILITY (1984). On the practicalities of negotiation in general,
see MAUREEN R. BERMAN & I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, THE PRACTICAL NEGOTIATOR (1982);
ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT
GIVING IN (1981).
11. The successful conclusion of negotiations is usually marked by the authentication and
adoption of the text of the agreement. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties notes
that:
[t]he text of a treaty is established as authentic and definitive:
(a) by such procedures as may be provided for in the text [of the treaty
or] ....
(b) failing such procedure, by the signature, signature ad referendum or
initialling by the representative of those States of the text of the treaty or of
the Final Act of a conference incorporating the text.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 7, art. 10.
The conclusion of negotiations should not be confused with the vast and comprehensive
process of concluding an international agreement. For a discussion of the entire process, see
SIR IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 29-44 (1984). See
also LORD ARNOLD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 1-236 (1961).
12. A treaty or international agreement creates legal rights and obligations when it enters
into force. SINCLAIR, supra note 11, at 44-46. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
states:
(1) A treaty enters into force in such manner and upon such date as it may provide
or as the negotiating States may agree.
(2) Failing any such provision or agreement, a treaty enters into force as soon as
consent to be bound by the treaty has been established for all the negotiating
States ....
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 7, art. 24. Article 11 of the Vienna
Convention specifies how a State may consent to a treaty. Article 11 states that:
[tihe consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature, ex-
change of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or ac-
cession, or by any other means if so agreed.
Id. art. 11.
13. "Every treaty in force is binding on the parties and must be performed by them in
good faith." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 7, art. 26. See SINCLAIR,
supra note 11, at 83-84. See also I.I. Lukashuk, The Principle "Pacta Sunt Servanda" and
the Nature of Obligation Under International Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 513, 515 (1989); Josef
L. Kunz, The Meaning and Range of the Norm "Pacta Sunt Servanda", 39 AM. J. INT'L L.
180, 183 (1945), reprinted in JOSEF L. KUNZ, THE CHANGING LAW OF NATIONS: ESSAYS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW 347 (1968).
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legal consequences of noncompliance are prescribed.' 4 Modern
international law also extends legal protection to the third phase of the
negotiation process - the period between the conclusion of negotiations
and the entry into force of the negotiated agreement. During this period,
states which have signed an agreement or expressed their consent to be
bound are obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object
and purpose of the agreement. 15 This requirement aims to prevent pro-
spective parties to the agreement from undermining the benefits accord-
ed by the agreement to other prospective parties. 16 Negotiating states
may also agree to apply the agreement, or parts of it, provisionally, prior
to its actual entry into force, in order to effectuate immediately certain
provisions of the agreement or to provide immediate legal protection to
the successful outcome of their negotiations.' 7 International law recog-
nizes the regime of provisional application, although the obligations
imposed on states during this period are somewhat enigmatic.
From the point of view of international law, the two prior phases of
the negotiation process, the prenegotiation and the actual negotiation, are
14. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 7, art. 60; SINCLAIR,
supra note 11, at 188-92. See also SHABTAI ROSENNE, BREACH OF TREATY 2 (1985);
ATHANASSIOS VAMvoUKos, TERMINATION OF TREATIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE
DOCTRINES OF REBUS SIC STANTIBUS AND DESUETUDE 7 (1985); MARK E. VILLIGER, CUS-
TOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 357-80 (1985); ARIE E. DAVID, THE STRATEGY
OF TREATY TERMINATION: LAWFUL BREACHES AND RETALIATIONS 5 (1975); D.N. Hutchin-
son, Solidarity and Breaches of Multilateral Treaties; 59 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 151, 151
(1988). But see Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Some Lingering Questions about Article 60 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 549, 550 (1989).
15. A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of
a treaty when:
(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty
subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention
clear not to become a party to the treaty; or
(b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into
force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 7, art. 18. See VILLIGER, supra note
14, at 315-26; TALITHA VASSALLI DI DACHENHAUSEN, LA CULPA IN CONTRAHENDO NEL
DIRITrO INTERNAZIONALE 3 (1983); Joni S. Charme, The Interim Obligation of Article 18 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Making Sense of an Enigma, 25 GEO. WASH.
J. INT'L L. & EcON. 71, 71 (1991); Hassan, supra note 5, at 451-70; Martin A. Rogoff, The
International Legal Obligations of Signatories to an Unratified Treaty, 32 ME. L. REV. 263,
264 (1980).
16. Rogoff, supra note 15, at 298-99.
17. The Vienna Convention states that "a treaty or part of a treaty is applied provisional-
ly prior to its entry into force if: (a) the treaty itself so provides; or (b) the negotiating States
have in some other manner so agreed .... " Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
supra note 7, art. 25(1). See generally Barbara E. Gauditz & Martin A. Rogoff, The Provi-
sional Application of International Agreements, 39 ME. L. REV. 29 (1987).
18. Gauditz & Rogoff, supra note 17, at 40-51.
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more problematic. In its final draft codification of the law of treaties,
the International Law Commission (ILC) recommended extending the
obligation to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and pur-
pose of an eventual negotiated agreement to the negotiating phase. 9
Thus, states participating in negotiations would incur substantive legal
obligations as soon as they entered into the negotiating process. The
Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties, however, did not adopt the
ILC's recommendation on this matter. The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties does not impose any substantive obligations on negoti-
ating states during the negotiating phase,2° but it is quite probable that
such obligations may be imposed by customary international law or by
general principles of law applicable to the relations between states. The
doctrine of culpa in contrahendo is well established in many domestic
legal systems,2 and there is authority that supports its international
19. The ILC's draft of Article 15 stated that:
A State is obliged to refrain from acts tending to frustrate the object of a proposed
treaty when:
(a) It has entered into negotiations for the conclusion of the treaty, while
these negotiations are in progress.
REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION ON THE WORK OF ITS EIGHTEENTH
SESSION, Official Commentary to the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, art. 15, U.N. Doc.
A/6309/Rev.l (1966), reprinted in 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 253, 316 (1967) [hereinafter ILC's
Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties]. For a detailed description of the negotiating history of
this provision, see Hassan, supra note 5, at 470-76. See also Philippe Cahier, L'obligation de
ne pas Priver un Traitd de son Objet et de son but Avant son Entree en Vigeur, 1 M9LANGES
FERNAND DEHOUSSE 31, 31-32 (1979).
20. Given the Vienna Convention's failure to adopt the ILC's recommendation, at least
one scholar has concluded that there is no uniform obligation no negotiate. Reuter, supra note
5, at 715. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, however, does impose procedural
obligations on negotiating states. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 7,
arts. 49 (concerning possible fraudulent conduct by a negotiating state), 50 (prohibiting the
corruption of a representative of a state by another negotiating state), 51 (prohibiting the
coercion of a representative of a state) & 52 (prohibiting the coercion of a state by the threat
or use of force).
21. Article 1337 of the Italian Civil Code is probably the clearest legislative statement of
the principal of culpa in contrahendo. "The parties, in the conduct of negotiations and the
formation of a contract, shall conduct themselves according to good faith." CODICE CIVILE
[Cc] art. 1337 (Italy) (Mario Beltramo et al. trans., 1993). In other civil law systems, the
doctrine rests on more general provisions, for example: CODE CIVIL SUISSE [Cc] art. 2
(Switz.) (1907) ("Every person must act in good faith both in the exercise of his rights and in
the fulfillment of his obligations."); CODE CIVIL [C. Civ.] art. 1382 (France) (1984) ("Any act
of a person which causes damages to another makes him by whose fault the damage occurred
liable to make reparation for the damage."); BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] art. 242
(F.R.G.) (1984) ("The debtor is bound to perform his obligation in good faith, having regard
to usage."). See Sylviane Colombo, The Present Differences between the Civil Law and
Common Law Worlds with Regard to Culpa in Contrahendo, 2 TILBURG FOREIGN L. REV.
341, 344 (1993); E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements:
Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 222 (1987); Edith Fine &
Friedrich Kessler, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of
(Vol. 16:141
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application.22 The principle of good faith,23 and most likely that of abuse
of rights,24 presumably also apply to all dealings between states. Any
one or all of these doctrines may be applicable in those situations where
the actions of a negotiating state with respect to the subject matter of
the negotiations cause injury to the interests of another negotiating state
during the negotiation period.
The following sections of this article describe and analyze the
prenegotiation period giving particular consideration to the role of
perceived legal obligation as a factor in the decision to initiate interna-
tional negotiations. The legal obligation to negotiate arising from cus-
tomary international law and from treaty commitments is examined
along with the problems involving the implementation of the obligation
to negotiate. In conclusion, the obligation to negotiate is examined in
light of modern developments in the theory and practice of the interna-
tional law of treaties.
At the outset, it is important to define the term "negotiation" and to
distinguish between the obligation to negotiate and other closely related
but significantly different legal obligations. In this article, the term
"negotiation" will be used in the narrow sense suggested by Ikl6 as:
a process in which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for
the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the real-
ization of a common interest where conflicting interests are pres-
ent. 5
Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 HARV. L. REV. 401, 408 (1964).
22. See generally VASSALLI DI DACHENHAUSEN, supra note 15.
23. See Hassan, supra note 5, at 443; Cot, supra note 5, at 140. See also ROSENNE,
supra note 7, at 135-79; ELISABETH ZOLLER, LA BONNE FOI EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC 2 (1977); BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 106-20 (1953); Georg Schwartzenberger, The Fundamental Prin-
ciples of International Law, 87 REC. DES COURS 191, 290-326 (1955).
24. See generally ALEXANDRE-CHARLES KIss, L'ABUS DE DROIT EN DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL (1953); CHENG, supra note 23, at 121-36; SIR HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNC-
TION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 286-306 (1933); Vladimir Paul, The
Abuse of Rights and Bona Fides in International Law, 28 OSTERR. Z. 6FFENTL. RECHT UND
V6LKERRECHT 107 (1977); NfCOLAS POLITIS, LE PROBLtME DES LIMITATIONS DE LA
SOUVERAINETI ET LA THtORIE DE L'ABUS DES DROITS DANS LES RAPPORTS INTERNATIONAUX
(1926).
25. IKLt, supra note 10, at 3-4 (emphasis deleted). See also OFFICE OF THE LEGAL AD-
VISER, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 8547, 14 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 19
(Marjorie M. Whiteman ed., 1970) ("Negotiation is used, in general, to refer to the exchange
and discussion of proposals by the representatives of the parties concerned with a view to
reaching a mutually acceptable agreement.") [hereinafter WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW]; Reuter, supra note 5, at 717 ("un geste formel et publique indiquant le debut
des ndgociations."). This definition of negotiation requires that negotiators behave "as
negotiators." They should not engage in acts which are incompatible with a good faith
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This view of negotiation directs attention to the more formal process of
state interaction and excludes "tacit bargaining or other behavior that
regulates conflict. 26 It also excludes other forms of dispute settlement,
such as conciliation, mediation, inquiry, arbitration, reference to interna-
tional or regional organizations, or judicial settlement,27 because such
procedures require some sort of agreement between the disputing parties
which presupposes prior arrangements or negotiations.
Behind this formal definition of negotiation, however, it is necessary
to distinguish two different, and contrasting, subjective views of the
negotiation process itself.2" According to one conception, the process of
negotiation is a part of the process of continuous contention and struggle
between the sovereign states involved. Thus, until the negotiations result
in a binding international agreement, the negotiating states have assumed
no legal obligations. Their sovereign right to complete freedom of action
remains intact. According to the opposing view, the process of negotia-
tion is a cooperative undertaking by states to resolve a mutual problem
in the common interest within the context of an interdependent com-
munity. This latter view supports extending obligations to the
prenegotiation and negotiation phases, while the former view strongly
believes in the legal freedom of states to act as they wish until they
actually undertake binding legal obligations.29
It is also useful to distinguish the obligation to negotiate from the
obligation to conclude an agreement. Although some scholars question
the utility of this distinction, believing that an obligation to conclude an
agreement is no more than a commitment to negotiate in good faith, °
the distinction is helpful, because it allows for separate consideration of
the decision to undertake negotiations. This decision to undertake nego-
tiations is the focus of this article and provides an understanding of the
intention to negotiate. See WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra.
26. IKL9, supra note 10, at 3. But see LALL, supra note 10, at 5-21. Lall uses the term
"negotiation" to include "[e]very form of conscious effort for the peaceful settlement,
adjustment, amelioration, or better understanding of international situations or disputes.
Id. at 6.
27. See generally J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (1984);
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: THE LEGAL ASPECTS (David Davies Memorial Institute of
International Studies Study Group ed., 1972).
28. See Reuter, supra note 5, at 714.
29. "Si 'on se place dans le cadre de la premiere vision, I'obligation de ndgocier ne peut
pas avoir une grande portde juridique, puisque les Etats ont besoin d'une libertd totale; si l'on
se place dans le cadre de la seconde l'obligation de ndgocier peut voir son contenu s'enrichir
considdrablement." Id.
30. See Beyerlin, supra note 5, at 407; Miaja de la Muela, supra note 5, at 394-95, 412,
414. See also 3 ANGELO PIERO SERENI, DIRiTTo INTERNAZIONALE 1389-92 (1962).
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manner in which negotiations are conducted. 31 It is also useful to distin-
guish between the obligation to negotiate and the obligation to consult.
32
An obligation to negotiate entails a commitment to some degree of
interaction between states in attempting to resolve a dispute or to deal
with a common problem. An obligation to consult, however, typically
involves a lesser degree of responsibility, if any, to consider the views
and positions of the other parties or to engage in mutual negotiations.
Finally, considered in this article is the important question of wheth-
er the obligation to negotiate imposes an affirmative obligation on a
state to seek actively negotiations with the other interested state or states
before it can legally engage in certain activities, or whether the obliga-
tion to negotiate simply requires the state subject to the obligation to
respond favorably when asked by the other state or states to enter into
negotiations.
I. PRENEGOTIATION AND THE DECISION TO NEGOTIATE
According to Professor I. William Zartman, a leading student of the
negotiation process:
[p]renegotiation begins when one or more parties consider negotia-.
tion as a policy option and communicate this intention to other
parties. It ends when the parties agree to formal negotiations (an
exchange of proposals to arrive at a mutually acceptable outcome
in a situation of interdependent interests) or when one party aban-
dons the consideration of negotiations as an option .... In essen-
tial terms, prenegotiation is the span of time and activity in which
the parties move from conflicting unilateral solutions for a mutual
problem to a joint search for cooperative multilateral or joint solu-
tions.33
Since the development of a mutual commitment to the cooperative
solution of an international problem occurs during the prenegotiation
31. Claims Arising out of Decisions of the Mixed Graeco-German Arbitral Tribunal Set-
up under Article 304 in Part X of the Treaty of Versailles (Greece v. F.R.G.), 19 R.I.A.A. 27,
55-56 (1972) [hereinafter Graeco-German Arbitration].
32. See generally KUSUMOWIDAGDO, supra note 5, at 55-56; KIRGIs, supra note 5, at 11-
12 & n.27; Affaire du Lac Lanoux (Spain v. Fr.), 12 R.I.A.A. 281 (1957) [hereinafter Lac
Lanoux Arbitration].
33. 1. William Zartman, Prenegotiation: Phases and Functions, in GETTING TO THE
TABLE, supra note 4, at 4. For a useful series of case studies on international negotiations that
devotes special attention to the prenegotiation phase, see WILLAIM MARK HABEEB & I.
WILLIAM ZARTMAN, THE PANAMA CANAL NEGOTIATIONS (FPI Case Studies No. 1, 1986);
NiLs JOHNSON & CHARLES PEARSON, THE NEW GATT" TRADE ROUND (FPI Case Studies No.
2, 1986).
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phase, it is evident that this phase needs to be closely studied and
analyzed to learn what can be done to encourage parties to commit to
negotiate.34
The decision to commit to a negotiated settlement, as Harold
Saunders rightly stresses, presents both substantive and psychological
problems.35 Substantive problems involve such matters as conflicting
strategic or economic interests. Psychological problems, on the other
hand, involve attitudes, fears, preconceptions, suspicions, and distrusts of
peoples and their leaders. It may be far more important to the successful
negotiated settlement of an international problem to eliminate the psy-
chological obstacles to settlement than to reach understandings on the
general substantive bases of discussions.3 6 It is important to realize that
psychological and substantive factors interact constantly during the
prenegotiation phase; progress or regress in one area contributes to
corresponding movement in the other.3 7 Substantive progress in resolv-
ing disputes between states also leads to improvement in the psychologi-
cal climate. 8
A major obstacle frequently preventing a state from engaging in
international negotiations is the internal political situation of the state.
The government may not be strong enough to undertake the resolution
of an international dispute through negotiations or have the support
needed to negotiate the particular position it favors.39 In order to enter
into negotiations, a government must formulate a position that will
command the necessary internal political support or undertake to devel-
34. See Saunders, We Need a Larger Theory of Negotiation, supra note 2, at 250. See
also SAUNDERS, THE OTHER WALLS, supra note 4, at 22.
35. Saunders, We Need a Larger Theory of Negotiation, supra note 2, at 260.
36. Harold Saunders cites as an example President Anwar Sadat's trip to Israel in
November 1977. This dramatic visit altered the psychological climate of Israeli-Egyptian
relations which allowed meaningful negotiations to take place even though at the time Israel
considered President Sadat's substantive proposals completely unacceptable. SAUNDERS, THE
OTHER WALLS, supra note 4, at 1-3.
37. See, e.g., id.
38. The history of the superpower arms control agreements provides an excellent
example of this phenomenon. Substantive progress in controlling or reducing armaments led
to improvement in the psychological climate. The improved psychological climate helped
further negotiations on arms control issues which were still outstanding. See GERARD C.
SMITH, DOUBLETALK: THE STORY OF THE FIRST STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS TALKS 1-3
(1980); THOMAS W. WOLFE, THE SALT EXPERIENCE 243-63 (1979).
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe provides another good example
of the close interaction between progress on substantive issues and improvement in psycho-
logical climate leading, in turn, to more substantive progress. See DECAUX, supra note 7, at
47-67, 122-25.
39. Saunders, We Need a Larger Theory of Negotiation, supra note 2, at 254. See
generally Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427 (1988).
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op the political support necessary for its position. There is continuous
interaction between the domestic political situation with respect to
support for the government's position toward negotiations and the
government's actions at the international level. Robert Putnam describes
the politics of international negotiations as a simultaneous "two-level
game." 4 According to Putnam:
[e]ach national leader appears at both game boards. Across the
international table sits his foreign counterparts, and at his elbows
sit diplomats and other international advisors. Around the domestic
table behind him sit party and parliamentary figures, spokespersons
for domestic agencies, representatives of key interest groups, and
the leader's own political advisors.4
In order to be successful in this multi-game environment, a national
leader must "build a package, 42 that will be acceptable to the other side
as well as to key domestic constituencies. These same considerations
also apply during the prenegotiation phase.
The principal goal of the prenegotiation process is to. remove both
substantive and psychological obstacles to the mutual commitment of
states to seek a cooperative, negotiated settlement to an international
problem or dispute, while at the same time eliminate any domestic
political obstacles to negotiations. Are there legal rules which are opera-
tive at this stage? If so, do they have the potential to play a significant
part in the decision of national leaders to undertake negotiations?
A review of the literature on the prenegotiation phase discloses
little, if any, reference to legal requirements to negotiate or to settle
disputes by peaceful means as significant factors in the decisions of
national leaders to enter into negotiations. Harold Saunders, for example,
isolates four "judgments" involved in the decision of national leaders to
commit to negotiations:
40. Putnam, supra note 39, at 434. See also DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNA-
TIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS (Peter B. Evans et. al eds., 1993). Cf. Abram
Chayes, An Inquiry into the Workings of Arms Control Agreements, 85 HARV. L. REV. 905,
907 (1972) (offering insights into the relationship of the negotiation process and compliance
by states with their treaty obligations). But see Jeffrey W. Knopf, Beyond Two-Level Games:
Domestic-International Interaction in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations, 47
INT'L ORG. 599, 600 (1993) (suggesting a "three-and-three" analytical framework, which
distinguishes three forms of domestic-international interaction and allows for a third level of
analysis taking into account a state's alliance partners and other third-party state actors, as a
preferable alternative to Putnam's "two-level game" approach).
41. Putnam, supra note 39, at 434.
42. Daniel Druckman, Boundary Role Conflict: Negotiation as Dual Responsiveness, in
THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS, supra note 3, at 87, 100.
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First is a judgment that the present situation no longer serves a
party's interests ....
Second is a judgment that the substance of a fair settlement is
available ....
Third is a judgment that leaders on the other side will be
willing and politically able to negotiate such a settlement ....
Fourth, a commitment to a negotiated settlement will require a
judgment that the balance of forces will permit a fair settle-
ment ....
Saunders is not alone in omitting legal requirements as an important
factor in the decision of national leaders to enter into negotiations."
The timing of the decision to undertake negotiations has recently
received considerable attention by scholars, who have highlighted the
concept of "ripeness" as a useful focus for policymakers concerned with
bringing other parties to the negotiating table. Once again, legal require-
ments to seek a negotiated solution to problems appear to play no part
in determining whether a particular dispute is "ripe" for a negotiated
settlement. The focus of analysts is almost exclusively on political and
other material factors.45
The seeming irrelevance of a perceived legal requirement to negoti-
ate does not necessarily mean that such a requirement cannot have
present or future importance. Legal rules, if they are responsive to the
underlying political realities and moral imperatives existing in the
community in which they operate, can help clarify and give operational
form to the shared expectations of community members.46 With respect
to the decision to enter into formal negotiations for the resolution of
mutual problems or conflicts, national political leaders may benefit from
clear or readily ascertainable legal requirements to commence negotia-
tions with other states. First of all, the existence of substantive legal
rules, which include an obligation to negotiate with respect to the par-
ticular matter in dispute (for example, the delimitation of an internation-
43. SAUNDERS, THE OTHER WALLS, supra note 4, at 24-32 (emphasis deleted).
44. See, e.g., IKLI, supra note 10, at 3; MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION,
supra note 10, at 354 (Ikl concludes that at present, power, rather than respect for interna-
tional law, is the dominant factor in international relations; therefore, "the time has not yet
come when we can formulate principles which express accurately the influences of interna-
tional law on the conduct of states, particularly as a factor which predisposes them toward or
influences them in negotiations.").
45. See, e.g., HAASS, supra note 4, at 2; ZARTMAN, supra note 4, at 3.
46. On the relationship of rules to the fostering and facilitating of cooperative activity,
see Philip B. Heymann, The Problem of Coordination: Bargaining and Rules, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 797 (1973).
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al maritime boundary or the responsibility for transboundary environ-
mental damage) can provide a principled framework for a negotiated
settlement and encourage nations to enter into negotiations. Second, the
determination that a legal obligation to negotiate does exist may prove
helpful to national leaders in persuading their foreign counterparts and
domestic constituencies that negotiations should be undertaken. It is not
unusual that the principal inhibition to undertaking the search for com-
mon solutions to international problems is domestic pressure militating
against cooperation and compromise, particularly with respect to issues
that are emotionally charged. In this setting it would be helpful for
national leaders to be able to point to international legal requirements
that negotiations be undertaken to deal with the particular matter.
Also, in seeking to bring other states to the negotiating table, ap-
peals to a legal requirement to negotiate the particular dispute may be
helpful in conditioning foreign public opinion to support the initiation of
negotiations. Moreover, if commencing negotiations is politically dif-
ficult, national leaders can point to a legal requirement that they enter
into negotiations as an expedient way of avoiding personal responsibility
for an unpopular decision. Finally, if an obligation to negotiate does
exist with respect to a particular matter, there can be detrimental legal
consequences for the nation that refuses to enter into negotiations.47
II. THE OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE IN CUSTOMARY AND
CONVENTIONAL INTERNATIONAL LAW
Although an obligation to negotiate may be highly desirable, it
appears that at present there is no general obligation imposed on states,
applicable in all situations of dispute or disagreement, to enter into
negotiations as a matter of customary or conventional international
law.48 There are, however, two decisions of the International Court of
47. See discussion infra parts III.B, III.C.
48. Paul Reuter has commented:
I! est certes tentant de chercher A moraliser le droit international et de se
placer le plus possible sur le plan de l'iddal. Mais il ne faut cependant pas
d~passer, sans sortir du domaine du droit, ce qui peut 8tre commundment accept6
par la socidtd internationale actuelle. A cet dgard il est malheureusement certain
qu'il serait peu rdaliste de vouloir d'une mani~re ginirale donner l'obligation de
nrgocier une portde qu'elle ne comporte pas ....
La conclusion qui s'impose est qu'il n'y a pas une obligation uniforme de
n~gocier, mais que selon les circonstances il y a une obligation plus ou moins
consistante, plus ou moins riche de devoirs. II n'y a pas d'autres explications
possibles ht la diversitd des cas d'esp ces.
Reuter, supra note 5, at 714-15.
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Justice (ICJ) which hold that states are obligated to negotiate in certain
situations. 49 The reasoning of the ICJ in those cases supports the general
proposition that states are under an obligation to negotiate in disputes
involving situations where each possesses legal rights which can only be
defined in relation to the legal rights of the other. Thus, once it is
determined that customary or conventional international law creates
rights for more than one state with respect to a particular matter, then,
in case of a dispute involving that matter, the states concerned are
obliged to enter into negotiations to resolve their differences. In addi-
tion, once it is determined that an obligation to negotiate exists as a
matter of customary or conventional international law, the content of
that obligation may be determined by closely scrutinizing the nature of
the substantive rights of the states involved.
An examination of those cases where the ICJ or another internation-
al arbitral tribunal has interpreted obligation-to-negotiate clauses in
international agreements provides substantial guidance in this endeavor.
Part A of this section examines the question of the existence of a gener-
al obligation to negotiate in international law with a focus on the United
Nations (U.N.) Charter. Part B analyzes the basis in customary interna-
tional law for determining whether an obligation to negotiate exists. Part
C analyzes the content of the obligation, specifically referencing a
number of cases involving the interpretation of treaties imposing that
obligation on the parties.
A. Is There a General Obligation to Negotiate?
Does the U.N. Charter prescribe, as a matter of conventional interna-
tional law, a general obligation to negotiate for the 180 member states?
A number of the stated purposes and principles of the U.N., as stipu-
lated in Articles I and 2 of the Charter, support the proposition that
member states should settle disputes by peaceful means and resolve
common problems through cooperation. 50 It is doubtful, however, that
any of these provisions impose general obligations on member states to
negotiate in the absence of more specific directives found in other
49. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. & N. Ireland v. Iceland), 1974 I.C.J. 3, 32 (July
25); North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 47
(Feb. 20).
50. For example, Article I of the U.N. Charter states that the purposes of the U.N. are:
(1) To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: ... bring about
by peaceful means .. . the adjustment or settlement of international disputes or
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.
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Charter provisions. For instance, Article 2(3) provides that "[a]ll Mem-
bers shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endan-
gered." 51 While there is considerable uncertainty concerning the scope
and, import of this very general proposition, it is probably safe to say
that it does not create an obligation for member states to negotiate.52
Also, the principle of good faith, which is referred to in Article 2(2),"3
has been held by the ICJ not to be itself. a source of legal obligation. 4
Thus, negotiations must be carried out in good faith once an obligation
to negotiate exists; but the principle of good faith alone does not impose
an obligation to enter into negotiations.
A specific reference to negotiation appears in Article 33. Article 33
enumerates possible methods of peaceful dispute settlement in the
context of the "Pacific Settlement" procedures of Chapter 6.5 Article 33
states:
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall,
first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional
agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own
choice. 6
The specific wording of Article 33 and its position in the Charter raise
two questions at the outset: (1) does the obligation contained in the
(3) To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character....
U.N. CHARTER, art. I (emphasis added).
51. Id. art. 2(3).
52. The obligation to settle international disputes by peaceful means does not include the
obligation to settle particular kinds of disputes by particular means or to follow any particular
order of priority in the choice of methods. LELAND M. GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 43 (3rd rev. ed. 1969) [hereinafter GOOD-
RICH, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS].
53. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(2) (Members "shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed
by them in accordance with the present Charter.").
54. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1988 I.C.J. 69, 105
(Judgment on Jurisdiction, Dec. 20); Yves Le Bouthillier & Michel Morin, La bonne foi en
droit international public, le r~glement pacifique des differends et le recours a la force lors
de la guerre du Golfe, 37 MCGILL L.J. 1026, 1029 (1992); Hugh Thirlway, The Law and
Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1960-1989, 60 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 9-10
(1989).
55. GOODRICH, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS,
supra note 52, at 41-43.
56. U.N. CHARTER, art. 33.
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Article extend to all disputes between states; and (2) does the Article
impose a general obligation on states or does it impose an obligation
only within the context of the pacific settlement procedures of Chapter
6?
It is clear from the wording of Article 33 that the obligation to settle
disputes by peaceful means does not apply to all disputes, but only to
those disputes "the continuance of which is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security."57 It is instructive to
note the different wording of Article 2(3) and Article 33. According to
Article 2(3) the dispute must be "international." Goodrich, Hambro, and
Simon point out that the word "international" was inserted in Article
2(3) to emphasize that the principle that states settle their disputes by
peaceful means does not apply to domestic disputes even though such
disputes could presumably endanger the maintenance of international
peace and security.58 Article 33, on the other hand, applies to "any
dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance
of international peace and security. '59 Article 33 must of course be read
together with Article 2(7), which provides that members are not required
to submit matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state to settlement under the Charter. The current interpretation of
the term domestic jurisdiction, however, would seem not to apply to any
dispute which could endanger international peace and security; therefore,
Article 33 should be read as imposing the obligation of peaceful settle-
ment on states involved in any serious dispute. This reading of Article
33, in light of Article 2(7), is further supported by the words "any
dispute" in Article 33.
With regard to the function of Article 33 in the overall scheme of
the Charter, it appears that the requirement of peaceful settlement should
be read in the context of the operation of Chapter 6. The phrase "first of
all" 6 would seem to contemplate a series of events beginning with
attempts at peaceful settlement by the parties, followed by investigation
by the Security Council, recommendations by the Security Council, or
referral by the parties of the matter to the Security Council. There are
indications in decisions of the ICJ, however, that the scope of Article 33
may be broader, transcending the procedures for peaceful settlement
57. Id.
58. GOODRICH, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS,
supra note 52, at 41.
59. U.N. CHARTER, art. 33.
60. "The parties to any dispute ... shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation
.... Id. (emphasis added).
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contained in Chapter 6 of the Charter. In the North Sea Continental
Shelf cases, for example,, the ICJ stated:
[the obligation to negotiate] merely constitutes a special application
of a principle which underlies all international relations, and which
is moreover recognized in Article 33 of the Charter of the United
Nations as one of the methods for the peaceful settlement of inter-
national disputes.6'
This language was later quoted with approval by the Court in the Fish-
eries Jurisdiction case.62
B. The Obligation to Negotiate in Customary International Law
1. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
63
The ICJ, in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, held that the
states involved in the continental shelf boundary disputes were obligated
under customary international law to delimit the disputed areas by
negotiation and eventual agreement.' 4 The Court derived this obligation
to delimit continental shelf boundaries by negotiation and agreement
from its detailed analysis of the legal regime of the continental shelf,
starting with the Truman Proclamation of 194665 and considering sub-
sequent developments including the Geneva Convention on the Con-
tinental Shelf of 1958. 66 The Court determined that the Convention on
61. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 47.
62. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, 1974 I.C.J. at 32.
63. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 3.
64. Id. at 53-54.
65. The Truman Proclamation, in relevant part, provides that: "In cases where the
continental shelf extends to the shores of another State, or is shared with an adjacent State,
the boundary shall be determined by the United States and the State concerned in accordance
with equitable principles." Pres. Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 39 (1945 Supp.), reprinted
in 59 Stat. 884 (1945).
In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ stated that the two concepts of the
Truman Proclamation, the concept of delimitation by mutual agreement and the concept of
delimitation in accordance with equitable principles, "have underlain all the subsequent
history of the subject." North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 33.
66. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S.
311 (entered into force June 10, 1964). The Convention provides that:
Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two adjacent
States, the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by agreement
between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is
justified by special circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by application
of the principle of equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which
the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.
Id. art IV, para. 2.
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the Continental Shelf was not opposable by the Federal Republic of
Germany because it was not a party to the agreement, 67 and the agree-
ment was not necessarily expressive of customary international law with
respect to the delimitation of continental shelf areas between adjacent
states.68 In the Court's view, however, there did exist applicable rules of
customary international law governing the delimitation of continental
shelf boundaries between adjacent states.
[D]elimitation must be the object of agreement between the States
concerned, and . . . such agreement must be arrived at in accor-
dance with equitable principles ... namely:
(a) the parties are under an obligation to enter into negotiations
with a view to arriving at an agreement, and not merely to go
through a formal process of negotiation as a sort of prior con-
dition for the automatic application of a certain method of
delimitation in the absence of agreement; they are under an
obligation to conduct themselves so that the negotiations are
meaningful, which will not be the case when either of them
insists upon its own position without contemplating any modi-
fication of it . 69
While the ICJ did find an obligation to negotiate on the part of the
states involved in continental shelf boundary disputes, it found that
obligation specifically in the substantive customary law regime of the
continental shelf. The ICJ did not derive the obligation from more
general principles of international law requiring peaceful settlement of
disputes, but rather from the specific rules and principles of customary
international law applicable to the delimitation of continental shelf areas
between adjacent states. Furthermore, the Court gave meaning to the
requirement of delimitation by agreement by mandating that the disput-
ing states enter into negotiations aiming at such agreement.70
67. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 25-26.
68. Id. at 45.
69. Id. at 46-47. Note, however, the statement of Judge Ammoun in his separate opinion:
I dispute that there is such an obligation in the present case. It cannot be
inferred from the Truman Proclamation, nor yet from Article 33 of the Charter,
which concerns disputes the continuance of which is likely to endanger the mainte-
nance of international peace and security, and is the less imperative inasmuch as it
empowers the Security Council "when it deems necessary, [to] call upon the parties
to settle their dispute by such means."
Id. at 146-47 (Ammoun, J., dissenting); see also id. at 215-16 (Morelli, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 46-47.
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2. The Fisheries Jurisdiction Case7
In the Fisheries Jurisdiction case, the ICJ took a more expansive
approach to the obligation to negotiate. In that case, the ICJ determined
that as a substantive matter, Iceland had certain "preferential fishing
rights" in particular maritime areas while at the same time Great Britain
had certain "traditional fishing rights" in the identical maritime areas.72
According to the Court, "[n]either right is an absolute one:"
[T]he preferential rights of a coastal State are limited according to
the extent of its special dependence on the fisheries and by its
obligation to take account of the rights of other States and the
needs of conservation; the established rights of the other fishing
States are in turn limited by reason of the coastal State's special
dependence on the fisheries and its own obligation to take account
of the rights of other States, including the coastal State and the
needs of conservation . . ..
The ICJ then indicated that "[t]he most appropriate method for the
solution of the dispute is clearly that of negotiation."74 Unlike its reason-
ing in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, Where it derived the
obligation to negotiate from a specific legal requirement of the cus-
tomary regime of the continental shelf, the ICJ in the Fisheries Jurisdic-
tion case found the obligation to negotiate "flow[ing] from the very
nature of the respective rights of the Parties . . . . According to the
Court, "[i]t is implicit in the concept of preferential rights that negotia-
tions are required in order to define or delimit the extent of those
rights .... ,,76
The reasoning of the Fisheries Jurisdiction case has far-reaching
implications with regard to the obligation to negotiate. Once it is deter-
71. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, 1974 I.C.J. at 3.
72. Id. at 30.
73. Id. at 31.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 32.
76. Id. In discussing this case, Professor Kirgis comments that:
What is important is that the Court found from the concept of a preferential right
(as it found from Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas and - in different
contexts - could find from other treaty norms or from state practice) a duty to
take account of other states' established interests .... The duty to consider other
states' established interests defined the "very nature of the respective rights of the
Parties," which in turn engendered the duty to negotiate,
KIRGIs, supra note 5, at 364.
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mined as a matter of conventional or customary international law that
the extent of particular rights of a state must be defined in relation to
and in consideration of the rights of another state, it follows that in case
of a dispute between those states regarding the precise definition of their
respective rights, those states are under an obligation to negotiate.
Moreover, this obligation does not stem from a specific customary norm
mandating the settlement of this particular type of dispute through a
negotiated agreement, as in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, but
rather from a principle of international law requiring negotiation of
disputes in situations where the extent of the rights of states are limited
by the rights of other states.77
3. Other Evidence of Custom
Increasingly, customary and conventional international law impose
obligations on states to settle disputes by agreement involving overlapp-
ing or mutually limiting legal rights. While there does not appear to be
a general rule requiring negotiation in all situations of conflicting inter-
ests of states, there are now many specific areas where the principles of
the North Sea Continental Shelf cases and the Fisheries Jurisdiction
case lead to the conclusion that negotiation is required. These are situa-
tions where the legal rights of states, whether derived from customary or
conventional international law, overlap and are thus mutually limiting.
The extent of the rights of one state, therefore, cannot be defined with-
out a definition of the rights of one or more other states. For example,
there are several provisions in the Convention on the Law of the Sea
which recognize the rights of more than one state in a particular mari-
time area or call for the management of a common resource or the
resolution of conflicts by agreement. 7' Also, many bilateral agreements
77. Professor Kirgis expresses this idea as follows:
When a state is under a duty (imposed by treaty, custom, or any other source of
international law) to consider the established interests of an identifiable group of
states while exercising a right of its own, the state planning to exercise its right
must consult those states before it acts, unless it is clear that the contemplated
action would not significantly affect their interests.
Id. at 362.
78. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature
Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) (entered into
force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea], art. 62 (providing
for the utilization of the living resources of the exclusive economic zone, including the
requirement that "[w]here the coastal State does not have the capacity to harvest the entire
allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or other arrangements ... give other States
access to the surplus of the allowable catch..."), art. 63 (concerning the conservation and
management of transboundary fish stocks which requires states "to agree upon the measures
necessary to co-ordinate and ensure the conservation and development of such stocks..."),
[Vol. 16:141
Obligation to Negotiate in International Law
contain provisions requiring a negotiated solution to common problems
or specifically recognize common legal rights in a particular matter.79
C. The Obligation to Negotiate and Conventional International Law
An obligation to negotiate on the part of states can arise from
commitments made in international agreements to which they are par-
ties. Sometimes these commitments are general, such as the promise to
settle disputes likely to threaten international peace and security through
negotiation or some other peaceful process.8" Sometimes these commit-
art. 197 (which mandates cooperation on a global or regional basis "in formulating and
elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures ... for
the protection and preservation of the marine environment...") & art. 199 (which requires
states to "jointly develop and promote contingency plans for responding to pollution incidents
in the marine environment").
79. After an exhaustive analysis of bilateral treaties in force, Professor Lagoni concludes
that "the obligation to negotiate in good faith about the exploration and exploitation of the
common deposit and about the apportionment of its proceeds can already be regarded as a
customary rule of international law." Ranier Lagoni, Oil and Gas Deposits Across National
Frontiers, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 215, 243 (1979). See also William T. Burke, Regulation of
Driftnet Fishing on the High Seas and the New International Law of the Sea, 3 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV. 265, 288-93 (1990); C.B. Bourne, Procedure in the Development of Interna-
tional Drainage Basins.: The Duty to Consult and to Negotiate, 10 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 212,
233 (1972).
80. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER, art. 33. See also Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, supra note 7, art. 65 (indicating procedures to be followed with respect to the
invalidity, termination, withdrawal from, or suspension of the operation of a treaty). Article
65(1) provides, in part, that "a party which ...invokes ... a ground for impeaching the
validity of a treaty, terminating it, withdrawing from it, or suspending its operation, must
notify the other parties of its claim." Id. art. 65(1). Article 65(3), however, states that if an
"objection has been raised by any other party, the parties shall seek a solution through the
means indicated in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations." Id. art. 65(3).
Professor Rosenne argues that Article 65 of the Vienna Convention might have an
extensive reach for its signatories.
Grosso modo Article 65 of the Vienna Convention may go further and, for the
.parties to it, may impose, as regards the treaties to which it applies, an obligation
which extends to all disputes relating to the application to a given treaty of the
provisions of the Vienna Convention regarding the invalidity or termination of the
treaty, regardless of whether the dispute would be one likely to endanger interna-
tional peace and security.
ROSENNE, supra note 7, at 264.
It is important to note that Article 60(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties deals with the termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a consequence
of its breach. Article 60(l) provides that "[a] material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of
the parties entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or
suspending its operations in whole or in part." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
supra note 7, art. 60(1) (emphasis added).
Article 60(2)(b) contains an analogous provision with respect to the termination or
suspension of multilateral treaties. Thus, a party may not unilaterally terminate or suspend the
operation of the treaty on account of a breach, but must resort to the procedures required by
Article 65 which may include the obligation to negotiate imposed by Article 33 of the U.N.
Charter. Id. arts. 60(2)(b) & 65; U.N. CHARTER, art. 33. See also ILC's Draft Articles on the
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ments are quite specific,8 such as the promise to engage in ongoing
arms control82 or economic8 3 negotiations or to resolve disputed boun-
dary, resource, or environmental questions through agreement.1
4
An interesting recent innovation is the creation of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), a loose but permanent
structure for conducting continuing negotiations on a variety of matters
Law of Treaties, supra note 19, arts. 57 & 63, at 421-26, 442-43; ROSENNE, supra note. 7, at
259-352; Herbert W. Briggs, Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties: The Vienna Convention
and the International Court of Justice, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 51, 52 (1974); Jurisdiction of the
ICAO Council (India v. Pakistan), 1972 I.C.J. 46 (Judgment, Aug. 18) (rejecting contentions
that a party could unilaterally terminate a multilateral treaty with respect to another party by
alleging the treaty's breach by that other party).
81. Professor Reuter calls such obligations "obligations de n6gocier lies," since the
obligation to negotiate is specifically tied to specific substantive commitments. Reuter, supra
note 5, at 720.
82. See, e.g., Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972,
U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435 [hereinafter ABM Treaty]; Interim Agreement on Certain
Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, May 26, 1972, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3462 [hereinafter Interim Agreement]. The ABM Treaty and the Interim
Agreement are known collectively as the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I).
Both agreements contain provisions for the continuation of active negotiations for the
limitation of offensive strategic arms. ABM Treaty, supra, art. X; Interim Agreement, supra,
arts. VII & VIII(2). See also Treaty on the Limitation of Offensive Arms and Protocol
Thereto (SALT II Treaty), art. XIV, June 18, 1979, U.S.-U.S.S.R., S. EXEC. Doc. Y, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess., 37 (1979) [hereinafter SALT II Treaty].
83. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Agreement Establishing the
Multilateral Trade Organization [World Trade Organization], GATT Doc. MTN/FA, pt. II, art.
111(2) (Dec. 15, 1993), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 13, 16 (1994) [hereinafter GATT: WTO
Agreement]. The GATT: WTO Agreement provides:
The [WTO] shall provide the forum for negotiations among its Members concern-
ing their multilateral trade relations in matters dealt with under the agreements in
the annexes to this Agreement. The [WTO] may also provide a forum for further
negotiations among its Members concerning their multilateral trade relations, and a
framework for the implementation of the results of such negotiations ....
Id. See also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, General Agreement on Trade in
Services, GATT Doc. MTN, pt. II, art. XIX, Annex lB and Add. 1 (Dec. 15, 1993), reprinted
in 33 I.L.M. 44, 61 (1994) [hereinafter GATT: Trade in Services Agreement]. The GATT:
Trade in Services Agreement provides:
1. In pursuance of the objectives of this Agreement, Members shall enter into
successive rounds of negotiation ... with a view to achieving a progressively
higher level of liberalization ....
4. The process of progressive liberalization shall be advanced in each such round
through bilateral, plurilateral or multilateral negotiations directed towards increasing
the general level of specific commitments undertaken by Members under this
Agreement.
Id.
84. See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 78, arts. 62, 63, 197 & 199.
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affecting security, cooperation, and human rights in Europe. 5 The
principal legal problems in assessing the obligations 'assumed by states
party to an agreement to negotiate are: (1) determining whether the
agreement imposes an obligation to negotiate in the particular factual
situation which confronts the parties; (2) if it does, what is the content
of that obligation; (3) whether there has been a breach of this obligation;
(4) if so, what are the legal consequences of its nonfulfillment; and (5)
what mechanisms exist, if any, for the authoritative resolution of these
questions.8 6 These questions raise several problems concerning treaty
interpretation.
Treaty provisions obligating the parties to negotiate are quite com-
mon in both bilateral and multilateral treaties. Such provisions may be
included in treaties for a number of different reasons. First, the parties
to a treaty may have been able to negotiate solutions to most of their
difficulties, but a few small matters might remain unresolved. Rather
than postpone agreement on the more significant matters, the parties
conclude an agreement that contains a provision to negotiate a solution
to the outstanding problem or problems in the future. The well-known
arbitration by President Calvin Coolidge of the Tacna-Arica Question
involving the Treaty of Peace of 1883 (Treaty of Ancon) which ended
the War of the Pacific between Chile and Peru87 is anexcellent example.
The parties were unable to agree on the organization of a plebiscite to
determine which nation would exercise sovereignty over the provinces
of Tacna and Arica. In the Treaty of, Peace, the parties agreed to con-
clude later a special protocol which would prescribe "the manner in
which the plebiscite is to be carried out, and the terms and time for the
payment by the nation which remains the owner of the provinces of
Tacna and Arica." 88
85. See generally DECAUX, supra note 7. See also Conference on Peace and Co-opera-
tion in Europe: Charter of Paris for a New Europe and Supplementary Document to Give
Effect to Certain Provisions of the Charter, Nov. 21, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 190 (1991) [hereinafter
Charter of Conference on Peace and Co-operation in Europe]. The Conference on Peace and
Co-operation in Europe creates new institutional structures for ongoing negotiations and
consultations within the CSCE. The most important institutions created are: the Council,
which consists of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the CSCE states and meets at least once
a year; the Committee of Senior Officials, which prepares the work of the Council; the CSCE
Secretariat, which supports the work of the Council; the Conflict Prevention Center; and the
Office for Free Elections.
86. See Reuter, supra note 5, at 729-33.
87. Tacna-Arica Question (Chile v. Peru), 2 R.I.A.A. 921, 926 (1925) [hereinafter Tacna-
Arica Arbitration].
88. Id. "Apparently the Parties in 1883-1884 thought it better to agree that they would
agree at some unspecified time in the future than to agree to disagree in the present." Id. at
928.
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The parties to a successful negotiation may also want to continue
the negotiating process in order to deal with related problems in the
future. For example, the United States and the Soviet Union included
provisions in both the SALT I and SALT II arms control agreements
calling for the continuation of negotiations on other outstanding arms
control problems.89
States may realize that their overlapping interests or legal rights with
respect to a particular matter may give rise to the need for cooperation
in the future. The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea provides
many examples. 90 The same principle applies with respect to pollution
control and the management and exploitation of the living and non-
living resources of the seas. 9' Other multilateral and bilateral agreements
contain similar provisions. 92
States may want to establish a forum for the mitigation or resolution
of certain differences through discussion and, if possible, agreement.
The process of discussion and negotiation, with regular interaction and
compromise, which it is hoped will lead to increased understanding and
the lessening of tensions, may be more important than the actual negoti-
ated solution. The CSCE provides an excellent example of this use of
agreement to negotiate.93 A leading student of the CSCE has described it
as "a process of permanent negotiation.
''9 a
In order to determine the legal content of the obligation to negotiate
assumed by agreement, it is helpful to examine the decisions of interna-
tional tribunals which have had to interpret such treaty provisions.
Although such reported decisions are few, a clear evolution in approach
can be discerned. This evolution parallels that of international law in
general which has moved from its earlier stress on the sovereignty of
states to the needs of the world community for cooperation in the peace-
ful settlement of international disputes.
In the Tacna-Arica arbitration, as indicated above, Chile and Peru
agreed to negotiate the "manner in which the plebiscite is to be carried
89. ABM Treaty, supra note 82, art. X; Interim Agreement, supra note 82, arts. VII,
VIII(2); SALT II Treaty, supra note 82, art. XIV. See also Smith, supra note 5, at 1549.
90. For instance, maritime boundary delimitation is to be undertaken on a cooperative
basis. See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 78, arts. 15 (delimitation of the
territorial sea between states with opposite or adjacent coasts) & 74 (delimitation of the ex-
clusive economic zone between states with opposite or adjacent coasts).
91. See id. arts. 62, 63, 197 & 199.
92. See, for example, the agreements cited and discussed in Lagoni, supra note 79, at
215, and Ranier Lagoni, Interim Measures Pending Maritime Delimitation Agreements, 78
AM. J. INT'L L. 345, 347 (1984).
93. See DECAUX, supra note 7, at 47-67.
94. Id. at 9.
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out, and the terms and time for the payment [of a certain sum of mon-
ey].'  According to the arbitrator, "their undertaking was in substance
to negotiate in good faith ... and it would follow that a willful refusal
of either Party to do so would have justified the other Party in claiming
discharge from the provision." Since the terms of the plebiscite were
not prescribed in the treaty, but were left to future agreement, the ar-
bitrator continued, "it is manifest that with respect to the negotiations
looking to such an agreement they retained the rights of sovereign States
acting in good faith. ' ' 97 With regard to the content of this standard, the
arbitrator stated:
Neither Party waived the right to propose conditions which it
deemed to be reasonable and appropriate to the holding of the
plebiscite, or to oppose conditions proposed by the other Party
which it deemed inadvisable. The agreement to make a special
protocol with undefined terms did not mean that either Party was
bound to make an agreement unsatisfactory to itself provided it did
not act in bad faith. Further, as the special protocol was to be made
by sovereign States, it must also be deemed to be implied in the
agreement ... that these States should act respectively in accor-
dance with their constitutional methods, and bad faith is not to be
predicated upon the refusal of ratification of a particular proposed
protocol deemed by the ratifying authority to be unsatisfactory. In
order to justify either Party in claiming to be discharged from
performance, something more must appear than the failure of
particular negotiations or the failure to ratify particular protocols.
There must be found an intent to frustrate the carrying out of the
provisions ... with respect to the plebiscite; that is, not simply the
refusal of a particular agreement proposed thereunder, because of
its terms, but the purpose to prevent any reasonable agreement for
a plebiscite .... A finding of the existence of bad faith should be
supported not by disputable inferences but by clear and convincing
evidence which compels such a conclusion.98
In addition, the arbitrator placed the burden of proof on Peru, the party
alleging bad faith in the conduct of negotiations."
In applying this "intent to frustrate" standard to the conduct of
negotiations, the arbitrator found that "[t]he record fails to show that
95. Tacna-Arica Arbitration, 2 R.I.A.A. at 926.
96. Id. at 929.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 929-30.
99. Id. at 930.
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Chile has ever arbitrarily refused to negotiate with Peru the terms of the
plebiscitary protocol."'" Moreover, the arbitrator noted that:
[s]uch causes of delay as a cabinet crisis, a revolution, the illness
of a minister, the death of a president - political contingencies
which did not lie beyond the contemplation of the Parties - can-
not be charged to either side as constituting a willful refusal to
proceed with negotiations. The argument based on the failure of
Chile to ratify the Billinghurst-Latorre Protocol of 1898 must
proceed on the assumption either that Chile was bound to ratify
that particular agreement or that Chile's conduct in relation thereto
establishes absence of good faith in the prosecution of negotiations
pursuant to the treaty. Neither position can be maintained. The
Billinghurst-Latorre Protocol provided that two important condi-
tions of the plebiscite, namely, the qualifications of voters and the
secrecy of the vote should be submitted to the arbitration of the
Queen of Spain. Chile had not promised to agree to such an ar-
bitration and acted within her rights in seeking a direct agreement
upon these points. Nor does Chile's conduct in relation to the
Protocol afford ground for a finding of bad faith .... The legisla-
ture of Chile under the constitutional system of Chile had the same
right to refuse to approve the Protocol as the Executive had to
negotiate it and no unfavorable inference can be drawn from the
exercise by the Legislature of its constitutional prerogative in the
circumstances described.""
In its 1931 Advisory Opinion on Railway Traffic Between Lithuania
and Poland,10 2 the Permanent Court of International Justice found that
the two states were bound by a resolution of the Council of the League
of Nations which recommended that:
the two governments ... enter into direct negotiations as soon as
possible in order to establish such relations between the two neigh-
boring States as will ensure the good understanding between na-
tions upon which peace depends ....
Poland argued that in accepting this recommendation both states under-
took the obligation not only to negotiate but also to come to an agree-
100. Id. at 933.
101. Id.
102. Advisory Opinion No. 42, Railway Traffic Between Lithuania and Poland, 1931
P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 42, at 108 (Oct. 15).
103. Id. at 115.
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ment to open the Landwar6w-Kaisiadorys railway sector to traffic.t°4 In
rejecting this argument, the Court stated:
[that] an obligation to negotiate does not imply an obligation to
reach an agreement, nor in particular does it imply that Lithuania,
by undertaking to negotiate, has assumed an engagement, and is in
consequence obliged to conclude the administrative and technical
agreements indispensable for the re-establishment of traffic on the
Landwar6w-Kaisiadorys railway sector.
0 5
The 1950 ICJ Advisory Opinion in the International Status of
South-West Africa is in the same vein.' °6 One of the questions facing the
Court in that case was whether the provisions of Chapter XII of the
U.N. Charter ("International Trusteeship System") imposed on South
Africa the obligation to enter into negotiations with the United Nations
with a view to concluding a trusteeship agreement with respect to
Southwest Africa.0 7 The territory of Southwest Africa was a former
German colony which had been placed under the aegis of South Africa
after the First World War.0 8 According to the mandate arrangement with
the League of Nations, South Africa was to have full power of ad-
ministration and legislation over the territory."°9 With the demise of the
League of Nations and the creation of the international trusteeship
system in Chapter XII of the U.N. Charter; the question arose as to
whether South Africa was legally obliged to conclude a trusteeship
agreement with the U.N. to place Southwest Africa under the newly-
created system of administration and supervision."°
In determining that South Africa was under no such obligation, the
Court engaged in a close, literal reading of the relevant provisions of the
Charter, and rejected the argument that the answer to the question posed
be sought in "general considerations" regarding the creation of the
trusteeship system and its relation to the existing mandate system of the
League of Nations. The Court regarded these considerations as "political
or moral duties." '' Thus the Court was reluctant to impose a duty on
104. Id. at 116.
105. Id.
106. International Status of South-West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. at 128.
107. Id. at 139-40.
108. Id. at 131.
109. Id. at 132.
110. Id. at 139.
111. Id. at 139. The court concluded:
It is true that, while Members of the League of Nations regarded the Mandates
System as the best method for discharging the sacred trust of civilization as provid-
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South Africa lacking a clear and specific manifestation of intent in the
governing international agreement even though the agreement involved
was the U.N. Charter, where one might think clear indications of object
and intent would govern.
The rationale for the contemporary evolution away from a state
sovereignty starting point for the interpretation of agreements to negoti-
ate, exemplified in the Tacna-Arica Arbitration, the decision of the
Permanent Court of International Justice in the Polish-Lithuanian Rail-
way case, and the 1950 ICJ Advisory Opinion in the International
Status of South-West Africa case, to a more cooperative, community-
based approach, demonstrated in the Graeco-German Arbitration which
is discussed below, is foreshadowed in two dissenting opinions in the
International Status of South-West Africa case. In that case, as discussed
above, the Court addresses the question of whether Chapter XII of the
U.N. Charter imposed an obligation on South Africa to enter into nego-
tiations for placing Southwest Africa under the U.N. Trusteeship
System. Judge de Visscher, in dissent, argues that "the individualistic
concepts which are generally adequate in the interpretation of ordinary
treaties" do not suffice "in the interpretation of a great international
constitutional instrument, like the United Nations Charter ...." " Thus,
rather than view the interpretative problem in the context of state
sovereignty,' 3 Judge de Visscher starts from the stated community
objectives for the trusteeship system contained in Article 76 of the U.N.
ed for in Article 22 of the Covenant, the Members of the United Nations consid-
ered the International Trusteeship System to be the best method for discharging a
similar mission. It is equally true that the Charter has contemplated and regulated
only a single system, the International Trusteeship System. It did not contemplate
or regulate a co-existing Mandates System. It may thus be concluded that it was
expected that the mandatory States would follow the normal course indicated by
the Charter, namely, conclude Trusteeship Agreements. The Court is, however,
unable to deduce from these general considerations any legal obligation for manda-
tory States to conclude or to negotiate such agreements. It is not for the Court to
pronounce on the political or moral duties which these considerations may involve.
id. at 140. But see id. at 186-90 (de Visscher, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 189 (de Visscher, J., dissenting).
113. The classic statement of the state sovereignty appears in the S.S. "Lotus" case. The
S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 20 (Sept. 7). The Permanent
Court of Justice stated:
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of
law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in
conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and
established in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing independent
communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon
the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.
Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
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Charter.11 4 Judge Alvarez, in his dissenting opinion, indicates that he
would go even further. He would derive not only an obligation to nego-
tiate, but also an obligation to reach an agreement, from the language of
the Charter read in light of the "spirit of the Charter.""' 5
The Graeco-German Arbitration of 1972,116 involving Greece's claim
that Germany was obligated to enter into negotiations regarding the
determination and payment of certain debts, represents an approach to
the interpretation of treaty-based obligations to negotiate similar to that
advocated by Judge de Visscher. In the Graeco-German case, Greece
argued that by undertaking an obligation to negotiate, Germany had not
only agreed to negotiate concerning the existence, amount, payment
schedule, and modalities of certain debts, but had also agreed that it did
in fact have financial obligations to Greece.' 17 This is a conclusion
which Germany vigorously denied."'
Greece argued that under Article 19 of the Agreement on German
External Debts of 1953," 9 the Federal Republic of Germany was under
an obligation to engage in negotiations to settle certain outstanding
claims. 20 Germany countered by contending that the Agreement im-
114. Article 76 of the U.N. Charter provides:
The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accord with the Purposes of
the United Nations laid down in Article I of the present Charter, shall be:
(a) to further international peace and security;
(b) to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement
of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive develop-
ment towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to
the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the
freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provid-
ed by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;
(c) to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to
encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the
world; and
(d) to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters
for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals, and also equal
treatment for the latter in the administration of justice ....
U.N. CHARTER, art. 76.
115. International Status of South-West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. at 183 (Alvarez, J., dissent-
ing). Judge Alvarez notes that "[e]ven admitting that there is no legal obligation to conclude
an agreement, there is, at least, a political obligation, a duty which derives from social inter-
dependence and which can be sanctioned by the Assembly of the U.N." Id. at 184.
116. Graeco-German Arbitration, 19 R.I.A.A. at 27.
117. Id. at 44.
118. Id. at 46.
119. Agreement on German External Debts, Feb. 27, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 443, 333 U.N.T.S.
3.
120. Graeco-German Arbitration, 19 R.I.A.A. at 42.
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posed no duty on its part to enter into a settlement. 2' In its decision, the
Tribunal first decided that there existed no conflict between the terms
"further discussions" and "negotiations."' 22 After concluding that Article
19 was a pactum de negotiando, rather than a pactum de contrahendo,'2'
the Tribunal stated:
[that] a pactum de negotiando is also not -without legal con-
sequences. It means that both sides would make an effort, in good
faith, to bring about a mutually satisfactory solution by way of a
compromise, even if that meant the relinquishment of strongly held
positions earlier taken. It implies a willingness for the purpose of
negotiation to abandon earlier positions and to meet the other side
part way. The language of the Agreement cannot be construed to
mean that either side intends to adhere to its previous stand and to
insist upon the complete capitulation of the other side. Such a
concept would be inconsistent with the term "negotiation." It
would be the very opposite of what was intended. An undertaking
to negotiate involves an understanding to deal with the other side
with a view to coming to terms. Though the Tribunal does not
conclude that Article 19 in connection with paragraph 11 of An-
nex I absolutely obligates either side to reach an agreement, it is of
the opinion that the terms of these provisions require the parties to
negotiate, bargain, and in good faith attempt to reach a result
acceptable to both parties and thus bring an end to this long drawn
out controversy .... The need for the peaceful solution of dif-
ferences between States, is so great and so essential to the well-
being of the community of nations that, when disputants have
reached a point of signifying their agreement to negotiate an out-
standing dispute, the subsequent negotiations normally ought to
lead to a satisfactory and equitable result.
124
The Tribunal then noted that the obligation to negotiate entails the
obligation to enter into "meaningful" negotiations.
To be meaningful, negotiations have to be entered into with a view
to arriving at an agreement. Though, as we have pointed out, an
agreement to negotiate does not necessarily imply an obligation to
reach an agreement, it does imply that serious efforts towards that
end will be made.
121. Id. at 46.
122. Id. at 54-55, 64.
123. id. at 55.
124. Id. at 56.
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In this case, an agreement to negotiate implies much more than
mere willingness to accept the other side's complete capitulation.
For such a result, negotiations are neither necessary nor desirable.
We construe the pertinent provisions of the Agreement to mean
that, notwithstanding earlier refusals, rejections or denials, the
parties undertook to reexamine their positions and to bargain with
one another for the purpose of attempting to reach a settlement.
25
Significantly, the Tribunal interprets the agreed commitment to negotiate
as "proof of the fact that both sides were prepared to remove the dispute
between them from the realm of contentiousness. Any interpretation of
these provisions must keep this objective in mind."'
126
The Lac Lanoux arbitration of 1956 involved an agreement between
France and Spain whereby a state that intended to take an action which
might alter the regime or volume of the flow of water also utilized by
the other state agreed to notify the other state in advance of its inten-
tions. 27 Spain argued that this provision required France to obtain the
prior agreement of Spain for a certain hydraulic project that it wanted to
undertake. Although the Tribunal employed a great deal of "state sover-
eignty" language in its opinion, 28 Lac Lanoux should not be understood
as rejecting the more community-oriented approach to the interpretation
of agreements to negotiate. The specific wording of the treaty article in
question clearly contemplates prior notification, not negotiation. The
Tribunal held that this prior notification provision, read in the light of
the general rule of good faith in international law, imposed on France
the obligations to consider Spanish interests, to attempt to satisfy these
interests to the extent compatible with its own interests, and to manifest
that it has a real concern for harmonizing its interests with those of its
neighboring riparian.
129
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE
With respect to the obligation to negotiate, the most difficult issues
arise in connection with the implementation of this obligation. Whether
125. Id. at 57, 59.
126. Id. at 60.
127. Lac Lanoux Arbitration, 12 R.I.A.A. at 289.
128. For example, the Tribunal stated that "[p]ushed to the extreme, the Spanish conten-
tion would imply either the general paralysis of the exercise of national jurisdiction in case of
a dispute or the submission of all disputes whatsoever to a third-party decision-maker;
international practice does not sanction either of these results." Id. at 310.
129. Id. at 315.
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the source of the alleged obligation is conventional or customary inter-
national law, problems arise in determining: (1) whether there exists an
obligation to negotiate in a given factual situation; (2) if an obligation to
negotiate is found to exist, whether a breach of that obligation has
occurred; and, (3) if a breach has occurred, what is an appropriate
remedy for the aggrieved state.
A. Determination of the Existence of an Obligation and Its Breach
If the alleged obligation to negotiate arises from an international
agreement which also contains a provision conferring jurisdiction on an
international tribunal (an established court or an ad hoc arbitral tribunal)
or if the parties to an international agreement containing a negotiation
provision are also parties to a more general dispute settlement agree-
ment, then questions involving the interpretation and application of the
obligation to negotiate can be resolved in a judicial forum by a third-
party decisionmaker. If the states involved are parties to a dispute
settlement arrangement which encompasses the particular dispute, the
same possibility of judicial determination exists if the alleged obligation
to negotiate arises from customary international law. Additionally, the
disputing states can always specifically agree to submit a particular
dispute to a third party decisionmaker for resolution.13
0
In most cases, however, it is unlikely that issues involving the
obligation to negotiate will be resolved by a judicial body. Therefore,
the question arises whether the obligation to negotiate has any sig-
nificant value as a norm of positive international law in the absence of
some provision for its judicial application. Does it actually influence the
behavior of state officials? Or, in the words of Professor Franck, does
the obligation to negotiate exert "a pull toward compliance on those
[parties] addressed normatively ... ?,,131 The answer to this question is
not clear or simple. Professor Franck suggests a helpful analysis focus-
ing on the following four factors: determinacy, coherent practice, sym-
bolic validation, and adherence. 32 While such an analysis may be em-
130. For more information on the role of third-party decision in obligation-to-negotiate
situations, see Reuter, supra note 5, at 731-33.
131. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 24 (1990).
132. Professor Franck defines these terms as follows:
Determinacy - "Determinacy ... denotes a rule's clarity of meaning: how effec-
tively it communicates with the parties to a dispute."
Symbolic validation - "The symbolic validation of a rule, or of a rule-making
process or institution, occurs when a signal is used as a cue to elicit compliance
with a command."
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ployed to determine whether or not a particular rule is legitimate, and
thus exerts a pull toward compliance, Professor Franck points out that it
is also prescriptive, because it suggests ways to augment the capacity of
a rule to obligate.133 Thus, if a rule is clearly stated, the product of an
accepted process of normative development, conceptually consistent with
other generally accepted norms, and applied consistently (or, at the very
least, demands for compliance are consistently made), then the rule will
exert a pull toward compliance.
Part III.B of this article will demonstrate that an obligation to
negotiate can be derived logically and coherently from existing interna-
tional legal doctrine; and that in fact, such obligations have been derived
by the ICJ from existing international legal concepts and precedents for
application in specific cases. Further analysis of the application of the
obligation to negotiate in other particular cases is undertaken in Part
III.C of this article. This analysis will demonstrate that the substantive
content of the obligation to negotiate is determinate. In other words, the
substantive content can be. clearly stated. When this is not the case, a
procedural approach to giving content to the obligation is available.
Given the strong theoretical basis for the rule, and its desirability in
interstate relations, diplomats and national leaders should frame their
expectations and demands for the opening of meaningful international
negotiations in terms of an international legal requirement to negotiate
in those situations where such an obligation exists within the meaning of
the Fisheries Jurisdiction case (that is, in those situations where the
rights of states overlap and are mutually defining and limiting).
The specific content of the obligation can be determined by refer-
ence to the applicable substantive law from which the obligation to
negotiate derives. Reliance on the obligation to negotiate in diplomatic
practice may possibly enhance the likelihood of "getting to the table,"
while at the same time strengthen the compliance pull of the rule.
Furthermore, by framing the call to negotiate in terms of a legal obliga-
tion, national leaders and diplomats may enhance the possibility that
public opinion, domestic or foreign, would support or accede to the
opening of negotiations.
Coherence - Coherence refers to consistent practice.
Adherence - "[A dherence ... [is] the vertical nexus between a primary rule of
obligation. ... and a hierarchy of secondary rules identifying the sources of rules
and establishing normative standards that define how rules are to be made, inter-
preted, and applied."
Id. at 84, 92, 135-49, 184.
133. Id. at 207.
Fall 1994]
Michigan Journal of International Law
Since the commencement or continuation of negotiations, which is
essentially a cooperative and collaborative enterprise, is the goal sought
by the obligation to negotiate, a coercive approach to a failure to negoti-
ate is not the optimal solution. A mechanism is needed to direct and
encourage states to enter into good faith negotiations when dealing with
particular problems. Shabtai Rosenne makes the following, suggestive
observations that address treaties specifically, but which may also be
read to apply to breaches of obligations imposed by customary interna-
tional law:
The general international law reflects the point of departure
that international treaties are concluded between States and are
only binding upon States when in force; and that breach of a treaty
is a matter for States, to be dealt with in accordance with current
diplomatic practices and procedures and closely influenced by
government policies at the given moment.
But alongside this standard diplomatic approach, entirely new
conceptions are being evolved.In these, the-distinction between a
purely political approach and a purely legal approach ... is be-
coming blurred .... The essence of this new evolution ... con-
sists in the creation of monitoring and reporting machinery aiming
at the systematic and organized mobilization of public opinion
(including governmental opinion) to give backing to what is com-
monly believed to be the intention of the drafters of the treaty,
deviation from which, endorsed by such monitors, attracts to the
government concerned charges (which no government likes. to hear)
of treaty-breaking. Monitoring in this sense exists both as an offi-
cial activity, and as a non-official activity . . . . It has one effect at
least which should be noted here: it is liable to reassert the com-
munity interest in the modern treaty as against the excessive bilat-
eralism characteristic of the Vienna Convention, and in that sense
may open the way to a new construction and a new conception of
the effect of breach within the context of the law of treaties.
1 34
It may be that the sort of international obligation monitoring and public-
ity function suggested by Rosenne is already operating at the interna-
tional level through the efforts of the U.N. General Assembly.
35
134. ROSENNE, supra note 14, at 40.
135. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
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B. Legal Consequences of Breach
Even though judicial or arbitral application of the obligation to
negotiate may not be possible in a particular case, there is still more
practical value to the obligation than the political, diplomatic, or public
relations uses suggested above. There are situations where the failure of
a state to honor a consensual or customary obligation to negotiate would
allow the aggrieved state to take certain legal action that would other-
wise be legally impermissible, such as the termination of a treaty rela-
tionship or acting in a manner otherwise prohibited.
With respect to treaties, Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties provides for the termination or suspension of a treaty in
case of a-material breach by one of the parties.136 A material breach is
defined as "the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment
of the object or purpose of the treaty."'137 Failure to enter into negotia-
tions might very well be a material breach if: (1) the treaty contained an
express provision requiring negotiation under certain circumstances; or
(2) the treaty created overlapping rights which could only be defined for
one party in relation to the rights of the other party or parties even
without an express requirement to negotiate. While terminating a treaty
relationship because of the failure of a party to negotiate when under the
obligation to do so is indeed a drastic response, the existence of that
possibility may provide additional leverage to the aggrieved state to
convince the other party to enter into serious negotiations.
The same considerations apply with respect to obligations arising by
virtue of customary international law. An aggrieved state may claim that
the failure of another state to enter into good faith negotiations when
required to do so by customary international law excuses the former
state from certain corresponding obligations with respect to the non-
negotiating state. Furthermore, violation of a customary or consensual
obligation to negotiate may allow the aggrieved state to take action,
short of terminating the treaty, that would otherwise be impermissible.
C. The Implementation of the Obligation Illustrated: The
Case of Large-Scale Driftnet Fishing
To illustrate the practical application of the obligation to negotiate,
this article will examine in some detail the recent large-scale driftnet
136. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 7, art. 60. See also supra
note 14 and accompanying text.
137. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 7, art. 60(3)(b).
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fishing controversy.'38 This examination reveals that a perceived obliga-
tion to negotiate contributed to meaningful international negotiations
undertaken within the context of the relevant substantive rules of inter-
national law. Even though national differences have not yet been fully
accommodated, the continuing existence of a recognized obligation to
negotiate contributes to channeling the dispute in the direction of a
multilateral, cooperative resolution.
During the 1980s, fishermen from several major commercial fishing
states began to employ large-scale pelagic driftnets for fishing opera-
tions. Almost immediately, concern developed that the widespread use
of large-scale driftnets would lead to the overfishing of certain fish
stocks and to an unacceptably large incidental catch resulting in the
death of marine mammals, birds, turtles, and nontarget fish (principally
tuna and salmon). In 1987, the United States unilaterally enacted legisla-
tion intended to control the use of driftnets and to obtain more precise
scientific information regarding the effects of driftnet fishing.'39 In
November 1989, a number of South Pacific states concluded a regional,
multilateral agreement to prohibit the use of long driftnets in their
exclusive economic zones (EEZ).' 4° In December 1989, the U.N. Gener-
al Assembly adopted Resolution 44/225, which called upon "interested
members of the international community ... [to] review the best avail-
able scientific data on the impact of large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing
and agree upon further co-operative regulation and monitoring mea-
sures."' 14' Resolution 44/225 also recommended the imposition of a
moratorium on all large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing operations by June
138. See generally Leslie A. Davis, North Pacific Pelagic Driftnetting: Untangling the
High Seas Controversy, 64 So. CAL. L. REV. 1057 (1991); Burke, supra note 79, at 265;
Report by the U.N. Secretary-General on Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and Its Impact
on the Living Marine Resources of the World's Oceans and Seas, U.N. Doc. A/45/663
(1990).
139. Driftnet Impact Monitoring, Assessment, and Control Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-220, Title IV, §§ 4001-4009, 101 Stat. 1477 (1987), 16 U.S.C. § 1822 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter Driftnet Act]. See Juan B. Otero, The 1987 Driftnet Act: A Step Toward Responsible
Marine Resources Management, 2 CoLo. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 129, 130 (1991). A
key provision of the Driftnet Act is its call for immediate "negotiations with each foreign
government that conducts, or authorizes its nationals to conduct, driftnet fishing that results in
the taking of marine resources of the United States in waters of the North Pacific Ocean
outside of the exclusive economic zone and territorial sea of any nation." Driftnet Act, supra,
§ 4006(a).
140. Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific,
Nov. 24, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 1449 (1990) (entered into force May 17, 1991).
141. Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and Its Impacts on the Living Marine
Resources of the World's Oceans and Seas, G.A. Res. 44/225, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp.
No. 49, at 292, U.N. Doc. A/44/746/Add.l (1989).
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30, 1992.142 Professor Burke highlights the importance of these provi-
sions (paragraphs 3 and 4 of Resolution 44/225) as representing "a
significant step in the development of the Law of the Sea ... [where]
the General Assembly has been used to respond to problems surround-
ing the high seas by recommending binding obligations on states.' 43
Recommendation by the General Assembly of a particular cooperative
course of action to be followed by "interested states" based on existing
international law provides an alternative mechanism for encouraging
states to fulfill their international legal commitments.
In spite of the measures described above, there are still serious
differences of opinion concerning the .benefits and dangers of large-scale
driftnet fishing. While there is mutual agreement on particular problems,
preferred solutions differ widely.' 44 Although the moratorium on large-
scale driftnet fishing called for in General Assembly Resolution 46/215
has been in effect since December 31, 1992, serious concerns remain
between states favoring and opposing the ban.
45
The driftnet fishing problem is principally limited to the high seas,
since states can regulate fishing activities in their EEZ's under current
international law. High seas fisheries, however, have become more
important in recent years because many large areas of the ocean have
been closed to foreigners under the EEZ regime and because technologi-
cal developments have made driftnet fishing more practical and econom-
ically advantageous. With respect to the conservation of fish in high
seas areas, states have both a particular and a general interest: (1) a
particular interest in anadramous, catadramous, or highly migratory fish
stocks which spend part of their lifecycle in that state's domestic waters
142. Id. at 294.
143. Burke, supra note 79, at 277. The General Assembly has .subsequently adopted two
additional resolutions on large-scale driftnet fishing. Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and
Its Impacts on the Living Marine Resources of the World's Oceans and Seas, G.A. Res.
46/215, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/46/215 (1992), Dec. 20, 1991, reprinted in
31 I.L.M. 241 (1992) (calling on states to "ensure that a global moratorium on all large-scale
pelagic driftnet fishing is fully implemented on the high seas of the world's oceans and seas
... by 31 December 1992"); G.A. Res. 45/197, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc.
AIRes/45/197 (1990), Dec. 21, 1990 (calling for the "full implementation [of Resolution
44/225] by all members of the international community ...."). The European Community
has also adopted regulations prohibiting the use of driftnets exceeding 1.5 miles in length on
the high seas. David E. Pitt, Fishing Fleets Are Pulling in Their Giant Nets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
9, 1994, at All.
144. For a description of the problems involved in large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing, see
Davis, supra note 138, at 1066-75.
145. For examples, see Pitt, supra note 143, at All. In late December 1993, environ-
mentalists, seeking to call attention to the continuing use of driftnets, unfurled a 1.2-mile long
driftnet across the base of the Eiffel Tower in Paris. See Activists String Giant Fish Net
Under Eiffel Tower in Protest, CHi. TRIB., Dec. 20, 1993, at 7. •
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or EEZ (or stocks which straddle that state's EEZ and the adjacent area
of high seas); and (2) a general interest in the taking of any high seas
fish as part of that state's "freedom of fishing" on the high seas. Also,
all states have a general interest in the protection and conservation of all
other marine life on the high seas, both as an economic matter (consid-
ering other marine life to have commercial value) and for non-commer-
cial reasons (e.g., preservation of endangered species or humanitarian
concerns).
No single state, group of states, or international organization is able
to make laws for high seas areas that deal effectively with the driftnet
issue. The cooperation of all interested states is required to settle this
issue. Given this, one may ask if there is an obligation on the part of
these "driftnetting" states to enter into negotiations with other interested
states to deal with the perceived problem. And, if there is such an
obligation, does it extend only to those states which can demonstrate an
individualized interest in a particular fish stock (e.g., because that stock
straddles its EEZ or originates in its internal waters), or does the obliga-
tion to negotiate also extend to those states which have no such in-
dividualized interests. Furthermore, if an obligation to negotiate does
exist in either of these situations, is that obligation an affirmative one,
such that a prospective driftnetting state must seek to negotiate before it
can engage in that practice, or is the obligation only an obligation to
respond to the call of other interested states for negotiations.
An analysis of the relevant international practice indicates that states
recognize that states engaging in large-scale driftnet fishing do have an
obligation to negotiate at least with those states with individualized
interests in the affected fish stocks. The obligation, however, does not
appear to be an affirmative one.' A look at the history of this con-
troversy indicates that all states, including those that engage in high seas
driftnetting, have felt legally obligated to enter into negotiations con-
cerning the matter. This recognition of an obligation to negotiate on the
part of high seas fishing states is in accord with the mandate of the
146. See Burke, supra note 79, at 288-89.
In the context of high seas pelagic driftnets, there is ample evidence that the
parties involved have engaged in negotiations, as well as other forms of internation-
al cooperation. Some long established international agreements are concerned with
pelagic driftnets [citing, inter alia, the International North Pacific Fisheries Con-
vention of 1952] and recently, special agreements have been reached to implement
measures concerning use of high seas driftnets and to lay a basis for further
cooperative action [citing bilateral agreements concluded by the United States in
1989 with Japan, Taiwan, and Korea].
Id. at 289 (citations omitted).
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Fisheries Jurisdiction case: an obligation to negotiate flows from the
simultaneous, and mutually limiting, rights of states in'the high seas. 47
Rights of states in the high seas areas are comprehensively defined in
the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. 148 For those states that are
not parties to the Convention, like the United States, the U.N. Conven-'
tion on the Law of the Sea is still regarded as stating applicable cus-
tomary law with respect to. the rights -of states concerning fishing and
conservation in high seas areas. 149 With respect to the general obliga-
tions of states in high seas areas, Article 117 of the Convention on the
Law of the Sea states the customarylaw principle that "[a]ll States have
the duty to take, or to co-operate with other states in taking, such meas-
ures for their respective nationals as 'may be necessary for the conserva-
tion of the living resources on the high seas."15 In addition, Article 118
provides:
States shall cd-operate with each other in the conservation and
management of living resources in the areas of the high seas.
States whose nationals exploit identical living resources, or dif-
ferent living resources in the same ' area, shall enter into negotia-
tions With a view to taking the measures necessary' for the con-
servation of the living resources concerned.''
The Convention also specifically recognizes particularized high seas
rights of coastal states. for anadramous,'52 catadramous, 153 highly migra-
tory, 54 and straddling stocks' that spend part of their lifecycle in the
147. See generally id. at 286-88.
148. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 78, arts. 62-64, 66-67, 117-18,
197 & 199.
149. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
pt. V, introductory note, at 5 (1986) ("By express or tacit agreement accompanied by con-
sistent state practice, the United States, and states generally, have accepted the substantive
provisions of the [U.N.] Convention [on the Law of the Sea], other than those addressing
deep sea-bed mining, as statements of customary law binding upon them apart from the
Convention.").
150. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 78, art. 117.
151. Id. art. 118.
152. Id. art. 66.
153. Id. art. 67.
154. Id. art. 64.
155. Id. ar. 63(2). The efforts of'the international community to deal With the problems
involved in the conservation and management of highly migratory and straddling fish stocks
provides another illuminating context in which to explore the existence, operations, and effect
of the obligation to negotiate. For background, see Alison Rieser, ASIL Observer Comments
on UN Conference on Straddling and Migratory Fish Stocks, ASIL NEWSL. (American
Society of International Law, Washington, D.C.) Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 12; Moritaka Hayashi,
The Management of Transboundary Fish Stocks under the LOS Convention, 8 INT'L J.
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internal waters or EEZs of those states. Given this rather clear state of
the law, it is not surprising that all states involved in the controversy
regard themselves, under an obligation to negotiate.
The legal consequences that would flow from a driftnetting state's
failure to enter into negotiations with states that have particularized
interests in specific fish stocks adversely affected by driftnet fishing
activity, or with states that are lacking a particularized interest but who
still have general legal rights with respect to the high seas areas, is
unclear.' In this context, it is instructive to consider the current con-
troversy concerning the use of unilateral trade measures by nations
seeking to protect marine mammals or conserve fishery resources in
high seas areas.
15 6
Can a nation that is a party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) 157 ban the import of marine products if those products are
obtained by fishing techniques which are harmful to marine mammals or
endanger particular fish stocks? A recent report by a GATT Dispute
Settlement Panel refused to allow the United States to take unilateral
trade sanctions, against Mexico because of the high incidental by-catch
of dolphins by Mexican vessels. 158 According to the Tuna-Dolphin Panel
Report, the unilateral restrictive measures taken by the United States
violated its obligations under the GATT.
59
Analyzing this question in the driftnet fishing context, if the United
States attempted to engage an offending user of large-scale pelagic
driftnets in negotiations pursuant to the principles of customary interna-
MARINE & COASTAL L. 245, 250 (1993); Bruce N. Shibles, Implications of an International
Legal Standard for Transboundary Fishery Management of Gulf of Maine-Georges Bank
Fishery Resources, TERR. SEA J., Sept. 1985, at 1.
156. See generally Belina Anderson, Unilateral Trade Measures and Environmental
Policy Protection, 66 TEMPLE L. REV. 751 (1993); Christopher A. Cherry, Environmental
Regulation Within the GATT Regime: A New Definition of "Product", 40 UCLA L. REV.
1061 (1993); Janet McDonald, Greening the GATT: Harmonizing Free Trade and Environ-
mental Protection in the New World Order, 23 ENVT'L L. 397 (1993); Matthew H. Hurlock,
Note, The GATT, U.S., Law and the Environment: A Proposal to Amend the GATT in Light of
the Tuna/Dolphin Decision, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 2098 (1992); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Free
International Trade and Protection of the Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict?, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 700 (1992); Edith B. Weiss, Environment and Trade as Partners in Sustainable
Development: A Commentary, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 728 (1992).
157. General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A 1l, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1948) [hereinafter GATT].
158. General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, United States - Restrictions on the
Imports of Tuna (Aug. 16, 1991), 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin Panel
Report]. See also General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, United States - Restrictions on
the Imports of Tuna (June 1994), GATT Doc. DS29/R, Limited Distribution [hereinafter
Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report 1I].
159. Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 158, at 1623; Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report II,
supra note 158, at paras. 5.20, 5.33.
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tional law and that state had refused to enter into meaningful discus-
sions, would this breach of the international legal obligation to negotiate
permit the United States, without violating its obligations under the
GATT, to prohibit the importation of fish products taken with large-
scale driftnets? The obligation to negotiate would have real international
significance, because its -breach would cause important legal con-
sequences for the offending state if the United States is permitted to
prohibit the importation of the driftnet fish products without violating
the GATT. While it appears doubtful, in light of the Tuna-Dolphin
Panel Report, that a breach of an obligation to negotiate would have
enabled the United States to take such action, there is language in the
decision that indicates that a breach of an obligation to negotiate may, in
certain situations, entail important legal consequences 6°
In the Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report, the United States argued that it was
justified in banning the importation of tuna from Mexico under Article XX
of the GATT.' 6' Article XX provides that "nothing in this Agreement shall
be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting
party of measures ... (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life
or health ..... 162 The Panel, however, disagreed with.the U.S. position
and refused to interpret Article XX(b) as applying extraterritorially1
63
According to the Panel, Article XX(b) applied only to the protection
of human, animal, or plant life within the territory of the state seeking to
ban importation of a product. 64 The Panel also noted that even if Article
XX(b) "were interpreted to permit extraterritorial protection of life and
health, [the U.S. measures] would not meet the requirement of necessity
set out in that provision."'
' 65
Furthermore, according to the Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report,
The United States has not demonstrated to the Panel - as required
of the party invoking an Article XX exception - that it had ex-
hausted all options reasonably available to it to pursue its dolphin
protection objectives through measures consistent with the General
Agreement, in particular through the negotiation of international
cooperative arrangements .... 66
160. Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 158, at 1620.
161. Id.
162. GATT, supra note 157, art. XX.
163. Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 158, at 1619-20.
164. Id. at 1620.
165. Id.
166. Id. (emphasis added).
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Article XX itself imposes no obligation to negotiate on a state seeking
to make use of the exceptions it provides;' 67 however, as has been
demonstrated, an obligation to negotiate deriving from the conventional
and customary law of the high seas certainly exists. Thus, in the driftnet
fishing case, if the question of "necessity" under Article XX were
dispositive with respect to the U.S. ability to invoke the exception
contained in Article XX(b) of the GATT, the breach of the obligation to
negotiate might very well be decisive.
CONCLUSION
The international negotiation process, viewed as a whole, is the
principal vehicle for cooperation between states. Whether negotiation
occurs within the context of established international structures, such as
the U.N., the CSCE, or the GATT, or is organized on an ad hoc basis to
deal with particular problems, the interaction of states through negotia-
tions concluding in binding international agreements represents the
international community of states' regular way of conducting its busi-
ness. 168 The law of treaties as it has developed over the past few centu-
ries, however, has not evolved in a manner that is fully responsive to
the continuity, intensity, or multiplicity of contemporary international
negotiation. 69 This is because that body of law developed primarily
167. See Schoenbaum, supra note 156, at 711.
168. "Treaties are the bones and sinew of the global body politic, making it possible for
states to move from talk through compromise to solemn commitment. They are also its moral
fiber, the evidence that governments and people have pledged their 'full faith and credit' to
one another." Thomas M. Franck, Taking Treaties Seriously, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 67, 67
(1988). The ILC has observed that "the conclusion of multilateral agreements has become the
main device in the legal regulation of the relations between States." Report of the Secretary-
General Reviewing the Multilateral Treaty-Making Process: Observations of the International
Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/35/312/Add.2, at 16 (1980).
169. As Shabtai Rosenne has noted:
one cannot fail to be struck by the fact that the codification of the law of treaties
• .. is still cast in a nineteenth-century mould .... What has been accomplished
certainly constitutes a very sound and well-drafted basis and even core for the law
for governing the major written instrument through which international transactions
of all kinds are commonly (though not invariably) recorded - the treaty, the
agreement between subjects of international law governed by international law. But
the codification as a whole still reflects the law as it was developed in the relative-
ly compact and relatively homogeneous international community before the effects
of self-determination of 1919 and of the massive decolonization of the 1960s could
be felt.
ROSENNE, supra note 7, at 83-84. See also Philip Allott, Mare Nostrum: A New International
Law of the Sea, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 764, 781 (1992) (The reliance by the international
community on treaties and other forms of agreements is "a clear sign of the impoverishment
of the international system as a political system, and of its rudimentary nature as a democra-
cy."); Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM. J.
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during a period when international negotiation and international agree-
ment played a far different role in the life of the world community.
Until the latter part of the nineteenth century, international negotiations
and agreements dealt principally with political matters: war, peace, and
neutrality; alliance and friendship; and the settlement of territorial
claims.' 70 Today, international negotiations and agreements are not
limited to political matters, but also incorporate legal, social, cultural,
economic, environmental, technical, and administrative matters. t1
Not only has the subject matter of international negotiations and
agreements expanded exponentially, but the way in which negotiations
are structured and conducted has also changed greatly. The hallmarks of
present day negotiations are continuity and interrelatedness. Conference
diplomacy and standing preparatory bodies, like the International Law
Commission, are becoming increasingly important. Rather than each
negotiation being a unique event to deal with a particular, discrete
problem, modern day negotiations are characterized by their length,
complexity, continuity, and inclusiveness. It is essential that the law of
treaties evolve to reflect these changing realities.
172
The thick web of multilateral, plurilateral, and bilateral treaty rela-
tionships and the numerous institutional arrangements for continuous
international negotiations which have developed over the past few
decades empirically demonstrate the need for appropriate changes in the
international law of treaties and in the reconceptualization of certain
fundamental premises upon which that law is based.173 As one student of
INT'L L. 259, 259 (1992) (The treaty process caused international environmental law to be
"slow, cumbersome, expensive, uncoordinated and uncertain.").,
. 170. Gauditz & Rogoff, supra note 17, at 30. See also Jost M. RUDA, THE FINAL
ACCEPTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS 6 (1976).
171. Gauditz & Rogoff, supra note 17, at 302. The Preamble to the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, supra note 7, pmbl., recognizes "the ever-increasing importance of
treaties as a source of international law and as a means of developing peaceful co-operation
among nations ..... Id.
172. See generally KAYE HOLLOWAY, MODERN TRENDS IN TREATY LAW 1-13 (1967).
See also ROSENNE, supra note 7, at 83. Rosenne makes the following interesting observation:
If the codification of the law of the sea in the 1958 Conventions was widely regarded
as the apogee of the Grotian heritage of the freedom of the seas - only to collapse
irrevocably within less than ten years - it is beginning to look as though the
codification of the law of treaties is in its intellectual approach somewhat similar.
Id. Thus, consistent with Rosenne's observation, the time may be ripe for a fundamental
rethinking of the theoretical foundations and particular legal doctrines of the law of treaties.
173. See id. at 80-84. See also ROSENNE, supra note 14, at 40 (commenting on the
"excessive bilateralism characteristic of the Vienna Convention [on the Law of Treaties]");
Shabtai Rosenne, Bilateralism and Community Interest in the Codified Law of Treaties, in
TRANSNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY; ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PHILLIP C. JESSUP 201
(Wolfgang Friedmann et al. eds., 1972).
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the international treaty process has written, "these manifestations in
treaties of common interest and common concern of states are positive
evidence of the interdependence of states as recognized ... within the
legal system of international law.' 74 The increasing use of and sig-
nificant changes in the legal regime applicable to the multilateral treaty
represent perhaps the most compelling evidence of this phenomenon.'75
Other positive evidence of the factual interdependence of states may be
found in the provisions of many postwar national constitutions which
accord legal primacy to norms of international treaty law over conflict-
ing domestic law 7 6 or declare that international law is part of the law of
the land.77 and in certain doctrinal changes in international treaty law
which have already been accepted.7 8 At the theoretical level, scholars
174. KUSUMOWIDAGDO, supra note 5, at 287. See also REUTER, supra note 7, at 1.
Reuter states that:
collectively the corpus of concluded treaties forms the reality and substance of an
international society from which treaties in turn will increasingly derive their legal
traits. In that process, nations starting out as entities closed to one another gradual-
ly open up and create the very environment to which they themselves submit.
Id. See also HOLLOWAY, supra note 172, at 1. Kaye Holloway notes that:
The measures taken, whether individually or collectively, to ensure the cohabitation
of States, separated from each other by a host of factors, constitute the content and
explain the nature of the international legal order. As the component parts evolve
so does the legal order which governs the external manifestation of their evolution
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increasingly question the bundle of ideas contained in the notion of
"state sovereignty," which traditionally has stressed the factual and legal
independence of states at the expense of the interrelational and com-
munity elements of international life.1
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The idea that states are under an obligation to negotiate, at least in
those situations where the extent of their rights can only be defined by
reference to the rights of other states, is both the pragmatic and logical
consequence of the interdependence of states in the modem world and
of the general recognition, by states, practitioners, and students of
international relations of that interdependence.
awareness of States that the will of individual States is no longer the only source of general
international law."); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 7, art. 9(2)
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The old theory of absolute sovereignty may have fitted in with the actual condi-
tions of prior centuries, but it is totally incompatible with the present-day inter-
dependence and solidarity of states, peoples and individuals. Sovereignty must be
mitigated by the exigencies of interdependence. It can no longer mean unlimited
discretion or freedom from international law.
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